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Beyond Gatekeeping: The Normative
Responsibility of Internet
Intermediaries
Marcelo Thompson*
ABSTRACT
This Article puts forward a normative approach to the
responsibility of Internet intermediaries for third-party content they
host. It argues that, in thinking about intermediary liability, the focus
should be on intermediaries' responsibility towards the reasoning
processes in reaching decisions, rather than on the outcomes of
intermediaries'decisions.What is necessary is a framework that, while
attaching responsibilities to such decisions, creates a cushioning
system for their decision making, mitigating the hardship of honest
mistakes. Within this framework, intermediaries must be seen not as
mere keepers of gates, but as designers of artifacts whose use plans
settle normative questions and play a vital role in the construction of
our normative reality. Accordingly, an interpretive commitment must
be required toward the integrity of such a reality.. Every time
intermediariesmake a decision, as they always will and should-in all
of this hidden jurisprudence-theintegrity of our normative order and
the values it reflects are at stake. This commitment to integrity must
be seen as part of a broader concern with justice (both corrective and
normative) in the internal life of the information environment. For the
same reason, however, we should expect responsible efforts, not
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perfection, from intermediaries. Like journalists who are entitled to
make mistakes, if only they seek responsibly to avoid the same (which
is the idea of responsible communication in defamation), so it should
be with Internet intermediaries. Understandingthe above enables us
to move away from outcomes-based approaches towards a more
granularand fair system of intermediary liability.
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Actors who implicitly claim that they can change the world through action (and
therefore through the creation of risk), and yet that they cannot affect the risks that
attend such action, assert a convenient but incoherent powerlessness in the exercise of
power.... To refuse to mitigate the risk of one's activity is to treat the world as a
dumping ground for one's harmful effects, as if it were uninhabitedby other agents.
1
Ernest Weinrib, The Idea of Private Law

I. INTRODUCTION

A. Neutrality and Reasonableness
In global conversations concerning the role of intermediaries in
the life of the information environment, an often-expressed view is
1.

Ernest J. Weinrib, The Idea of Private Law 152 (2d ed. 2012) (emphasis added).
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that intermediaries should not be held liable for third-party content
they host. 2 Such a view is based on a thesis that holding Internet
intermediaries liable would conscript them to act as unofficial censors,
making decisions on the nature of content that should not be under
their purview. To avoid liability, intermediaries would more often
than not simply take content down after receiving a complaint by
Internet users. 3 Any modulation of information flows according to
what intermediaries find legal or illegal would raise concerns of legal
principle regarding the protection to freedom of expression. After all,
intermediaries should not be the ones expected to make such decisions
at all. Decisions as to what is legal or illegal, what stays and what
goes, should be made entirely by courts or other public
authorities, if not by authors themselves.
decision-making
4
Intermediaries should be neutral implementers of these decisions.
This thesis above-call it the neutrality thesis-supposes that
the exemption of intermediaries from liability will lead to their
restraint from the making of decisions regarding content they host.
Though the neutrality thesis may, on its face, express a fairly
reasonable concern with the formidable power intermediaries
command in our time, the neutrality thesis above cannot respond to a
very basic question: if intermediaries do command so strong a power,
would it not be worse for freedom of expression, and ultimately for law
itself, if their decisions go unchecked? This question may sound
paradoxical in light of the notes above; is the neutrality thesis not
committed precisely to limiting the power of intermediaries?
The paradox is only apparent. For reasons explained below,
the neutrality thesis might in fact, if unsuspectedly, contribute to the
unreasonable exercise of power by intermediaries. And it is precisely
due to the effects of power exercised unreasonably by Internet
intermediaries that law and policy must conceive of a framework that
identifies the reasonable boundaries of intermediaries' responsibilities,
2.

See, e.g., ARTICLE 19, INTERNET INTERMEDIARIES: DILEMMA OF LIABILITY 3 (2013);

see also infra Section I.C for further discussion.
This has been appropriately referred to in the literature as the problem of collateral
3.
censorship. See J.M. Balkin, Free Speech and Hostile Environments, 99 COLUM. L. REV. 2295,
2296-307 (1999) (introducing the problem of collateral censorship); Michael I. Meyerson,
Authors, Editors, and Uncommon Carriers:Identifying the "Speaker" Within the New Media, 71
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 79, 118 (1995); Felix T. Wu, Collateral Censorship and the Limits of
Intermediary Immunity, 87 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 293 (2011) (criticizing provision of immunity

without correspondence to the existence of collateral censorship); see also infra Section I.B for
discussion.
See Corey Omer, Intermediary Liability for Harmful Speech: Lessons from Abroad,
4.
28 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 289, 315 (2014) ("The core arguments against intermediary liability today
do not turn on a belief that all content should be permitted online, but merely that governments
cannot encumber intermediaries with the task of judging which content is permissible and which
is not.'). As this Article will argue, governments not only can, but they should.

[Vol. 18:4:783

VAND. J. ENT. & TECH. L.

as well as the conceptual foundations of these boundaries.
Frameworks that seek to avoid the unavoidable or the
necessary-namely, that intermediaries make decisions in one way or
another-are a normative misrepresentation of reality. What law and
policy really need is a framework for reasonable decisions to be made
by intermediaries, which creates a cushioning system for decision
making at the same time that it attaches responsibilities to such
decisions, attenuating the hardship of honest mistakes.
Such a framework, in its design and foundations, must treat
the problem of intermediary liability as a normative one and one of the
central normative problems of our time. The framework must pay
heed to the state-like "nodality"5 of intermediaries in the
techno-normative networks that connect societies-that is, the
gravitational pull that enables intermediaries to reconfigure online
flows of information,6 the social understanding of these, and
ultimately the very reasons upon which we act.
Internationally, intermediary liability models have tended to
steer away from this normative question and the commitment towards
reasonableness and responsibility that the question entails. Most
recently, one can observe a trend, reflected in the UK Defamation Act
of 20137 and in the world's first Internet Bill of Rights,8 of adopting
exemption regimes that instantiate the ways of thinking of the
neutrality thesis-coming as a late reflection of the model pioneered
by the Communications Decency Act of 1996 (CDA). 9 This model,
addressed in Section I.C below, is grounded on a strongly utilitarian

5.

See HELEN MARGEPTFS, INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY IN GOVERNMENT: BRITAIN AND

AMERICA 3 (photo. reprint 2003) (1999) (speaking about nodality as a tool of government and
denoting it as "being in the middle of an information or social network"); Helen Z Margetts, The
Internet and Public Policy, 1 POL. & INTERNET 1 (2009). But see Seth F. Kreimer, Censorship by
Proxy: The FirstAmendment, Internet Intermediaries,and the Problem of the Weakest Link, 155

U. PA. L. REV. 11, 27, 70 (2006) (treating intermediaries as the weak link in the chain of
communication).
6.
See WILLIAM H. DUTTON, SOCIAL TRANSFORMATION IN AN INFORMATION SOCIETY:
RETHINKING ACCESS TO YOU AND THE WORLD 34 (2004) (discussing "reconfiguring access" as the

output of an ecology of decisions, which equates access with communicative power and nodality
ultimately becomes a physical manifestation of authority).
7.
Defamation Act 2013, 2013, c. 26 (U.K.).
8.
Lei No. 12.965, de 23 de Abril de 2014, Didrio Oficial da Uni~o [D.O.U.] de 24.4.2014
(Braz.) (establishing principles, guarantees, rights and duties for the use of the Internet in
Brazil) [hereinafter Marco Civil]; see also Kevin Collier, Brazil Signs Marco Civil, its Internet
Bill

of

Rights,

into

Law,

THE

DAILY

DOT

(Apr.

23,

2014,

10:09

AM),

http://www.dailydot.com/politics/marco-civil-internet-bill-of-rights-brazil-rousseff
[https://perma.
cc/HX3L-T7XPI ('"The world's first major Internet Bill of Rights is finally law.").
9.
Communications Decency Act, 47 U.S.C. § 230 (2006). The current alternative model
to exemption of liability-the model of strict liability-is a mirror image of the exemption model,
and provides no answer to the questions that concern us here either. See infra Section II.B and
Part III.
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tradition that sees the Internet as basically a platform to generate
ever more innovation; 10 a tradition that, unfavored in today's
literature,11 seeks to affirm the value of speech even where value there
is none. It is a model where aggregative utilitarian consequences
matter more than thinking about the reasonable boundaries of
personal autonomy, and which thus cannot be captured by any form of
normative, deontological thinking.
In the field of intermediary liability, this model is reflected in
theories that see intermediaries merely as keepers of gates, 12 rather
than agents whose normative decisions matter, in themselves, for how
we author our lives.
Yet, intermediaries' decisions effectively
matter-and must be seen as mattering-in the grounds on which
they are made. In their very fabric, these decisions reflect or obscure,
promote or undermine values such as privacy, reputation, gender
equality, sexual freedom, and values generally protected by children's
rights. Yet, existing gatekeeper theories refrain from conceiving of an
institutional landscape in which every actor, in its own particular
way, is expected to fulfill a certain commitment towards the
recognition of such values-without whose availability no autonomous
life is possible. Ultimately, these are theories that dissociate debates
concerning the liability of intermediaries from broader debates
concerning our conceptions of justice.
Although the model of recent exemption regimes has been
pioneered in the United States and is undergirded by its strong First
Amendment traditions, the arguments introduced by this Article will
provide pause to consider the model's boundaries and alternative
13
approaches-if only as an exercise of "institutional imagination."
10.
The Act itself affirms the policy of the United States: "(1) to promote the continued
development of the Internet and other interactive computer services and other interactive media;
(2) to preserve the vibrant and competitive free market that presently exists for the Internet and
other interactive computer services, unfettered by Federalor State regulation . . ." 47 U.S.C. § 230
(b)(1)-(2) (emphasis added). Other than reference to criminal laws, intellectual property rights,
and limited privacy aspects, all of which are areas in which the Act has no effects, no allusions
are made to the protection of individual rights. See 47 U.S.C. § 230.
11.
See Joel R. Reidenberg, Jamela Debelak, Jordan Kovnot & Tiffany Miao, Fordham
Law School-Center on Law and Information Policy, Fordham L. Legal Stud. Res. Paper No.
2046230, Section 230 of the Communications Decency Act: A Survey of the Legal Literature and
Reform Proposals 9 (2012) (noting the increase in scholarly literature critical of Section 230 since
2007 due to issues such as cyberbullying and online harassment illustrates problems in Section
230's breadth).
12.
See infra Section I.C.
13.
See generally Roberto Mangabeira Unger, Legal Analysis as Institutional
Imagination, 59 MOD. L. REV. 1 (1996). Approaches in the literature so far have tended to
imagine solutions that do not stray far from the two major fixed paradigms this article discusses:
the paradigm of immunity (or quasi-immunity) and the paradigm of strict liability. See, e.g.,
Mark A. Lemley, Rationalizing Internet Safe Harbors, 6 J. ON TELECOMM. & HIGH TECH. L. 101,
115-16 (2007) (paradigm of immunity); Michael L. Rustad & Thomas H. Koenig, Rebooting
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While legislative debates in the United States have seemed pretty
much settled for around two decades now, 14 the global conversation
continues, and it is important to engage with. This Article does so
from the perspective of contemporary developments in the common
law of Canada and the United Kingdom and in the law of the
European Union while also referring to domestic law if appropriate.
Far from being jurisdictionally situated, however, this Article raises
questions of international resonance.
Through answering these
questions, a deeper and more granular understanding of the problem
of intermediary liability is hopefully provided in light of its normative
dimensions.
Normative coherence is of utmost importance in this task. If
the problem this Article addresses is indeed a central one, the
framework put forward here ought to hang coherently together with
its deeper conceptual foundations. This Article does so by asking what
commitments justice-corrective and, more broadly, normative
justice-requires from Internet intermediaries. 15 Accordingly, this
Article engages, on one hand, with theories of justice regarding
relations of correlativity we find in private law generally and tort law
in particular, and, on the other hand, with theories that understand
justice as entailing a requirement of responsibility towards our
normative commitments and the normative order more broadly. It
puts forward a solution to the problem of liability of intermediaries
that seeks to live up to these larger concerns.
In doing so, this Article proposes a best-efforts and normsbased approach 16 that attempts to calibrate the liability of
intermediaries in the light of two competing considerations. On one
hand, the proposed approach takes into account the public interest in
the services rendered by Internet intermediaries and the difficulties
intermediaries face in settling disputes they are called on to settle.
For example, should a privacy-infringing public post on Facebook,
which may have deleterious consequences but which the author
refuses to delete, remain?
The decision will often rest on
indeterminate technological, legal, and-more broadly-cultural
factors, which are difficult even for courts to determine. On the other
Cybertort Law, 80 WASH. L. REV. 335, 392 (2005) (paradigm of strict liability). But see Ali Grace
Zieglowsky, Immoral Immunity: Using a Totality of the CircumstancesApproach to Narrow the
Scope of Section 230 of the Communications Decency Act, 61 HASTINGS L.J. 1307, 1325 (2010)
(proposing a subjective, totality of the circumstances test).
14.
See REIDENBERG ET AL., supra note 11, at 52 (noting that proposals for legislative
change have been minimal). But see Rustad & Koenig, supra note 13, at 376 ("Cybertort law is
not settled until it is settled right .... ").
15.
See infra Sections III.B-C.
16.
See infra Sections IV.A and C.

2016]

BEYOND GATEKEEPING

789

hand, it is important to recognize that the risks to which victims of
online content are exposed spring, at least in part, from
intermediaries' own services and decisions. Hence, some dimension of

reasonable care should be expected from intermediaries in putting
efforts in place to normatively evaluate disputes concerning content
they host-and, of course, to ultimately act upon the conclusions they

reach.
This normative dimension of responsibility matters in three
ways.

First, it matters because it shows that the reasonable care

expected from intermediaries should not be directed merely towards
the taking down of content.17
Reasonable care concerns, above
everything, reason. And while this may seem an obvious point to
make, it has not proven to be so obvious in the law. Second, the
normative dimension of responsibility matters because it indicates an
interpretive commitment, where truth is an achievement worth
striving towards.18 Intermediaries thus have a margin of appreciation

to carry out what is not an obligation of results, but one of reasonable
interpretive means. They can be mistaken as long as they responsibly
try not to be. Third, the normative dimension matters because it
connects the responsibility expected from intermediaries to the
normative order as a whole. It indicates, thus, the importance of
approaching
intermediaries'
commitments
from
a coherent
perspective, both internally and externally. Given the nodality of
intermediaries in the normative community, 19 the erosion of their
normative responsibilities carries effects that transcend even the
(already problematic) logical effects of ordinary cases of incoherence.
In pursuing a normative dimension of intermediaries'
responsibility, this Article seeks to reconcile intermediaries' position

17.
See infra Section II.C.
18.
See infra Section III.B.
19.
Karine Nahon has explored the idea of nodality under slightly different terminology,
in what she calls a "normative theory of network gatekeeping salience." See Karine BarzilaiNahon, Toward a Theory of Network Gatekeeping: A Framework for Exploring Information
Control, 59 J. AM. SOC'Y FOR INFO. SCI. & TECH. 1493, 1493 (2008). Network gatekeeping salience
here refers to the interactions between gatekeepers and those she calls the "gated" and the
extent to which the latter can respond to the political power of the former. Id. at 1494. Nahon's
work develops an important taxonomy to account for the ways in which, by exercising control
over information, gatekeepers shape norms within gated communities, by protecting them from
entry from outside. Id. at 1496. Her normative account, however, is limited by the fact that
regulation is approached in her work as a meta-mechanism that applies to control
procedures-seeming to imply a detachment between network salience and a higher normative
sphere. Id. at 1498. 1 would like to suggest these levels are more interconnected than she
implies; the nodality of Internet intermediaries, expressed in each of their design decisions,
enables them to shape law itself. This is an important dimension of their responsibility because
it fundamentally affects how we lead our lives and find our bearings in the world.
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as designers of technological artifacts 20 with broader ideals of justice
within which intermediaries' activities ought to be approached.
Because of these ideals, an interpretive commitment of integrity is
required from intermediaries between the design of their artifacts and
a normative order that transcends the purely factual gates
intermediaries are said to keep. Ultimately, this Article argues that
intermediaries' responsibilities regarding the normative order find
their closest expression in the idea of responsible communication in
the public interest. 21 Journalists have the duty of acting responsibly
towards the truth of facts they ascribe to people, though the hardship
of such a duty is cushioned by the excuse of honest mistakes. And so
it also should be with Internet intermediaries. The law should expect
from them a commitment of normative responsibility towards the
cases they settle, yet be accommodating of the difficulties in always
getting the facts and the law straight.
Before we proceed with our analysis and exposition of this
thesis, two clarifications are necessary. The first is a taxonomic one.
This Article uses the terms "Internet intermediary" or simply
"intermediary" in a somewhat elastic way.
In the universe of
intermediaries, there are those entities, like Verizon or Akamai, which
are either in the business of simply routing content through the
Internet or caching it-that is, hosting content transitorily to enable
or facilitate its accessibility via the underlying infrastructure of cables
and protocols. 22 These intermediaries have little chance to reflect
upon content they route or cache and thus also have little chance to
have their reason engaged by such content to any significant extent.
They are not the kinds of intermediaries we are concerned with here.
The concern here is with intermediaries-from Facebook to Amazon,

20.
See infra Section III.A.
21.
See infra Section 1V.B for a discussion on the common law of defamation.
22.
Operating at the physical and logical layers of the Internet, these intermediaries
relate to the content layer mostly on topological terms. To the extent that they have some
nodality on the Internet, this nodality rests on aspects of more physical nature-it rests on the
ability of these intermediaries to transport content or facilitate its retrieval. See infra Part III
(discussing teleological element that is vital to analysis). The distinction between actors who host
and cache or merely conduct content is at the core of the liability provisions of the European
Directive on Electronic Commerce. See Council Directive 2000/31/EC, arts. 12-14, 2000 O.J. (L
178) 1 [hereinafter Electronic Commerce Directive]; see also 17 U.S.C. § 512(a) (2010) (exempting
US service providers from copyright liability for transitory digital network communications). But
see Nathan Lovejoy, Standardsfor Determining When ISPs Have Fallen Out of Section 512(A), 27
HARV. J.L. & TECH. 257 (2013) (discussing erosion of Section 512(A) boundaries). The literature
and classificatory diverges regarding Internet layers are vast. Here I employ the classifications
adopted in Yochai Benkler, From Consumers to Users: Shifting the Deeper Structures of
Regulation Toward Sustainable Commons and User Access, 52 FED. COMM. L.J. 561 (2000). For
a more recent analysis, see also YOCHAI BENKLER, THE WEALTH OF NETWORKS: How SOCIAL
PRODUCTION TRANSFORMS MARKETS AND FREEDOM 392 (2006).
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from Google to Spotify-whose activities entail the prolonged hosting
of content of any nature as well as the making available of such
Very importantly, we are also only
content over the Internet.
to the extent that they have
intermediaries
such
concerned with
actual-rather than purely constructive-knowledge of their hosting
of such content. Whether intermediaries' reason ought to be engaged
even before notice is given to them may be a valid concern, but it is not
23
one that will occupy us here.
The second clarification has to do with the idea of neutrality
itself.
B. Liability's Pendulum
Ideals of neutrality, as we find them in the realm of the
information environment, can be understood as unwitting
restatements of more established doctrines of neutral concern in the
realm of politics. Neutral political concern has it that "governments
must so conduct themselves that their actions will neither improve nor
hinder the chances individuals have of living in accord with their
conception of the good. ' 24 Complementary to this notion, though
approached from a normative dimension, is the notion that
governments ought to exclude the pursuit of ideals from the scope of
their action. The doctrine of exclusion of ideals, as Joseph Raz
suitably terms it, requires governments to be "blind to the truth or
falsity of moral ideals, or of conceptions of the good. '25 It asks
governments to see to it "that neither the validity, cogency or truth of
any conception of the good, nor the falsity, invalidity or stupidity of
any other may be a reason for any governmental action. '26 Such sorts
of commitments, which can be more broadly accommodated within a
theory of political neutrality,27 are perhaps the sorts of commitments
23.
Statute and case law concerning the kind of intermediaries we focus on here tends
to circumscribe liability to situations where notice has been given to such intermediaries. One
interesting derivation of these discussions concerns the liability of Search Engine Operators
(SEO), where courts have tended to recognize the more active and instrumental role of SEOs in
the aggregation, sorting and presentation of content. Even here, however, courts have tended to
limit SEOs' responsibilities to situations where notice has been given and SEOs have
nonetheless refrained from taking the content down within reasonable time. For a good overview
of jurisprudence in this regard, see Anne Cheung, Defaming by Suggestions: Searching for
Search Engine Liability in the Autocomplete Era, in COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVES ON THE
FUNDAMENTAL FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION (Andras Koltay ed., 2015).
24.
Joseph Raz, THE MORALITY OF FREEDOM 108 (1986).
25.

Id.

26.

Id.

Raz notes the close interdependence between the doctrines of neutral political
27.
concern and exclusion of ideals. Id. Kymlicka understands them as two different visions of
neutrality, which he terms consequential neutrality and justificatory neutrality, whereas Rawls
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one may think we should expect from Internet intermediaries. These
are the sort of commitment the neutrality thesis is thought to reflect
and advance; that, by exempting intermediaries of liability, we will be
fostering their evaluative restraintregarding content they host.
There is not much for which to commend doctrines of
neutrality. In the world of politics, they have been persuasively
challenged by communitarians, feminists and, ultimately, by liberals
themselves. At the heart of the criticism is the implausibility of
principled inaction even where there are strong reasons to act in order
to change a certain state of affairs. Doctrines of neutrality work by
bracketing certain reasons 2 -namely, conceptions of the good, out
from the world of politics. And they do so precisely where action by
the state upon such reasons would be necessary to enable individuals
and groups to live autonomous lives. On the other hand, whether or
not there are merits regarding political neutrality, it is worth
recognizing no theory of neutrality commands inaction even in the
light of illegality. Doctrines of neutrality are typically rights-based
doctrines, and work by ascribing to rights (which can command state
29
action) a lexical priority over conceptions of the good (which cannot).
Whether or not there may be reasons for expecting political restraint
from intermediaries, why should we expect their restraint even before
flagrant illegality, even before the known violation of fundamental
rights by means of their own services?
In earlier works, I have explored in greater detail the problem
of neutrality in relation to the regulation of the information
environment.3 0 Here however, it will be more helpful to deploy
resources towards thinking more directly about what justice requires
from Internet intermediaries, which is addressed in Part III. We must
divides them between neutrality of effect and neutrality of aim, recommending the later while
noting the implausibility of the former. Compare Will Kymlicka, Liberal Individualism and
Liberal Neutrality, 99 ETHICS 883, 883-86 (1989), with JOHN RAWLS, POLITICAL LIBERALISM
192-95 (1993). While this Article does not pursue this distinction further, the concern here is
clearly with the justificatory, or normative, dimension of neutrality-with the extent to which
politics engages reason.
28.

See MONIQUE DEvEAUX, CULTURAL PLURALISM AND DLEMMMAS OF JUSTICE 104-05

(2000) (criticizing "neutral liberal political bracketing"); see Marcelo Thompson, Evaluating
Neutrality in the Information Age: On the Value of Persons and Access (2013) (unpublished
Ph.D. thesis, University of Oxford) (on file with the Bodleian Library, University of Oxford)
(developing Wall's argument in relation to the regulation of the information environment).
29.
John Rawls, The Priority of Right and Ideas of the Good, 17 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 251
(1988). This notion was later developed as a central feature of Rawls's conception of justice as
fairness. See JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 28 (2d ed. 1999) ("The priority of the right over
the good in justice as fairness turns out to be a central feature of the conception [of justice as
fairness] .").
30.
Thompson, supra note 28; see also Marcelo Thompson, The Neutralization of
Harmony: The Problem of Technological Neutrality, East and West, 18 B.U. J. SCI. & TECH. L.
303 (2012).
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be focused on the requirements of justice, in particular, since the
neutrality thesis reveals itself so self-defeating an enterprise that it
would be unwarranted for us to take its exploration much further.
There are two points that speak very strongly against the
neutrality thesis. The first is that there is not really a neutrality
thesis when we see that very little exists to restrain intermediaries'
power of, on their own accord, determining the fate of content online.
The second is that such a lack of restraint is especially pronounced
where a system of exemption of liability is in place. On one hand,
systems of exemption do nothing to address, or indeed to preclude,
autonomous decision making by intermediaries. That intermediaries
may make autonomous decisions as to whether or not to take content
down is, in fact, something that cannot practicably be forestalled, on
pain of completely undermining the way the Internet operates.
Systems of exemption of liability do not-and cannot-change that.
On the other hand, if there is any logical connection between
exemption of liability and autonomous decision-making by
intermediaries it is a seemingly unexpected one for advocates of the
neutrality thesis. Systems of exemption of liability further, rather
than preclude, the possibility that autonomous decision making will be
31
undertaken by intermediaries.
In effect, disconnected from the normative strictures of the rule
of law, unencumbered by the concern that courts may hold them
accountable for the lack of reasonableness or care occasionally
reflected in their decisions, intermediaries are left with freedom to
reach whatever decisions they will. The resources and wisdom
invested by intermediaries in reaching such decisions will be only as
good and as powerful as intermediaries themselves. The worse the
intermediary, the worse the decision; the more powerful the
intermediary, the more pervasive its effects. And to the victims of all
forms of Internet-based whim, the restless seconds that flow from a
bad decision are something no court can reinstate into the sands of

31.
The very logic behind the introduction of the so-called "Good Samaritan Defense" of
Section 230 was the encouragement of principled action by Internet intermediaries. See, e.g.,
DANIELLE KEATS CITRON, HATE CRIMES IN CYBERSPACE 170 (2014) ("In passing Section 230,
Congress sought to spur investment in Internet services while incentivizing online
intermediaries to restrict access to objectionable material."); Wu, supra note 3, at 302 ("§ 230 was
premised in part on a desire to encourage, rather than discourage, the filtering of content, by
removing legal disincentives to filter."). But see Doe v. GTE Corp., 347 F.3d 655, 660 (7th Cir.
2003) (J. Easterbrook, noting "Protection for 'Good Samaritan' blocking and screening of
offensive material [is] hardly an apt description if its principal effect is to induce ISPs to do
nothing about the distribution of indecent and offensive materials via their services."); Andrew
M. Sevanian, Section 230 of the CommunicationsDecency Act: A "Good Samaritan"Law Without
the Requirement of Acting as a "Good Samaritan,"21 UCLA ENT. L. REV. 121 (2014) (explaining
how courts have ignored underlying legislative intent of Section 230).

VAND. J. ENT. & TECH. L.

[Vol. 18:4:783

time. It is easy to see, thus, that no neutrality is truly promoted by
the neutrality thesis-quite the contrary.
However, there is still some limited wisdom in the
justifications of the neutrality thesis which invites respect. It has
indeed been the case that courts and legislatures around the world
have embedded systems of strict liability for intermediaries in a
number of fields of the law. Such systems leave intermediaries in a
situation of profound uncertainty as to how to proceed in the face of
complaints raised by victims of content they host. The existence of
these systems has not been a uniform tale-and the legislative
tendency around the world has increasingly been one of establishing
systems of exemption of liability for intermediaries. These systems, as
noted, have been pioneered by the United States and recently adopted
in the United Kingdom (in defamation law)32 and in Brazil
(horizontally, as in the United States). 33 The adoption of exemption
systems reveals an understandable wish to flee the uncertainties of
systems of strict liability. Yet, as is argued below, such a wish needs
not commit us to the normative problems entailed in the neutrality
thesis. Rather, there must be a way between strict liability and no
liability whatsoever.
That the trajectory of the law concerning intermediary liability
has followed a pendular movement between both extremes might be
due to the also understandable difficulties of identifying legally
adequate standards in between. Both such extremes, however, tend to
create default situations of unjustifiable challenge to fundamental
rights.
Strict-liability regimes necessarily threaten freedom of
expression. No-liability regimes jeopardize privacy, reputation, racial
and gender integrity, as well as children's rights. 34 In the short run,
no-liability regimes eliminate incentives for intermediaries to respond
to notifications concerning violations of such rights. In the long run,
32.
See Defamation Act 2013, 2013, c. 26 (U.K.).
33.
See Marco Civil, supra note 8.
34.
See CITRON, supra note 31, at 177 (discussing the problem in the context of
harassment and nonconsensual pornography and suggesting that Congress should exclude the
application of Section 230 in such cases). Yet, it is worth noting that the immunity of
intermediaries should not be foregone only in these extreme cases, of what Citron calls the
"worst actors." See id. Rather, whenever, the law can be calibrated to enable the pursuit of a
proper balance by intermediaries between the rights they should observe, at the same time
attenuating the hardship of such a pursuit, exemption of liability becomes a wrong response.
Felix Wu developed a similar argument by focusing on the consequences of liability for freedom of
expression. In his view, whenever collateral censorship is not a problem, immunity is the wrong
response. See Wu, supra note 3, at 302. However, the collateral violation of speech ceases to be a
problem whenever the liability of intermediaries can be appropriately calibrated-but so does
the violation of other fundamental rights cease being a problem, and ultimately the violation of
the very idea of law. The argument cannot be a purely utilitarian one. See infra Section I.C.
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they eliminate incentives to publicize existing criteria and
methodologies to deal with violations, let alone to collaborate with
other parties towards the common development of those.
Such consequences are yet more problematic in cases where it
is not clear that exemption of liability will also extend to violations of
freedom of expression.
In those cases, while intermediaries are
certain to escape liability, for example for damages to reputation
arising from the permanence of content online, there would be no such
certainty regarding the violation of freedom of expression if
intermediaries were to take content down.3 5 The easy and natural
path would be for the content to stay, however damaging that could be
to the integrity of the victim's personality.
Thus, neither such
extreme-neither strict nor no-liability systems-provides an
adequate solution to the problem concerning us here.
C. Gatekeepers:Internet Utilitarianism
The pendular trajectory noted above points to a common
limitation of discussions on intermediary liability. The limitation is
that such discussions have tended so far to focus predominantly on the
outcomes of intermediaries' decisions, rather than on the reasons used
by intermediaries in reaching them. 36 In other words, those are

35.
That is the situation in Brazil. See Marcelo Thompson, Marco civil ou demarcaqdo
de direitos? Democracia, razoabilidade e as fendas na internet do Brasil [Civil Rights Framework
or Demarcation of Rights? Democracy, Reasonableness and the Cracks on the Brazilian
Internet], 261 REVISTA DE DIREITO ADMINISTRATIVO 203 (2012) (Braz.). In Europe, neither the

takedown nor the keeping of content online are covered by an exemption of liability. See, e.g.,
LILLIAN EDWARDS, WORLD INTELLECTUAL PROP. ORG. [WIPO], ROLE AND RESPONSIBILITY OF THE
INTERNET INTERMEDIARIES IN THE FIELD OF COPYRIGHT AND RELATED RIGHTS 12 (2010),

http://www.wipo.int/export/sites/www/copyright/en/doc/role and responsibility of_ the internet_
intermediaries final.pdf [https://perma.ccW698-KEWA] (noting the absence of any protection in
the Electronic Commerce Directive against liability for takedown but also the possibility of
contractual exemptions). In the United States, the CDA creates immunity for intermediaries
through First Amendment doctrine. By not reaching intermediaries as it reaches state actors,
this enables the former to moderate content online in ways the latter cannot. See CITRON, supra
note 31, at 168.
36.
Even in literature more deontological in nature, intermediaries' activities tend to be
approached from the perspective of their consequences rather than of the normative means
through which these are reached. See, e.g., Citron, supra note 31, at 167 (basing her analysis on
the role of website operators as "important sources of deterrence and remedy"); see also Rustad
and Koenig, supra note 13, at 383-87 (basing their argument in the notion that "ISPs are in the
best position to prevent tort injuries" and that 'limiting ISP immunity would help solve the
injury problem"). This consequences-based approach is entailed in the very notion of collateral
censorship, which is deontological only to the extent that it focuses on the reasonable boundaries
of freedom of expression, but utilitarian in its seeking to protect everything that exceeds these.
See, e.g., Wu, supra note 3, at 296 ("The unique harm of collateral censorship, as opposed to
self-censorship, lies in the incentives that intermediaries have to suppress more speech than
would be suppressed by original speakers.") (emphasis added).
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discussions founded on the adoption of factual, outcomes-based
perspectives, and on the consequential motives for pursuing these,
rather than on a more in-depth inquiry concerning their normative
underpinnings.
Karine Nahon's influential theory of network gatekeeping, for
instance, although seeking to advance a normative argument, ends up
directing her resources to functional power relations, which rest on
purely factual assumptions of information control 3 7-not
on the
reasons entailed in intermediaries' relations with people and in
intermediaries' responsibilities towards such reasons. Her concern is
thus with the power of Internet intermediaries rather than, more
38
properly, with their authority.
This focus on power rather than authority is symptomatic. For
while power is indeed an idea that pertains in the realm of facts,
authority pertains in the realm of norms. Power, in Robert Dahl's
famous conceptualization, is about getting someone to do something
they would not otherwise do. 39 Yet, Dahl himself notes that a richer
account of the concept must inquire into the base of an actor's power, 40
the idea of authority reflecting a special case of such a base. 4 1
Authority, as Veitch et al. note, is power in its normative form, 42 for it
is power exercised with reference to a certain normative base.43
Authority not only entails the manipulation of reasons for action, 44 it
reflexively grounds that manipulation in reason itself.

37.
See Nahon, supra note 19, at 1496.
38.
Nahon's framework does account for relations of authority held between individuals
and the state or industry regulators, and between individuals themselves, but not between
intermediaries and people. See id. at 1498-99. In the realm of Internet intermediaries, authority
only comes into the equation in the functional way data-analysis frameworks normally conceives
of it, namely as a mirror image of the linking structure of the Internet. The more links an
intermediary has, the more authority is ascribed to it. See id. at 1499.
39.
See Robert A. Dahl, The Concept of Power, 2 BEHAV. SCI. 201, 202-03 (1957).
40.
Id. at 201. For Dahl, "The base of an actor's power consists of all the
resources-opportunities, acts, objects, etc.-that he can exploit in order to effect the behavior of
another." Id. at 203.
41.
Id. at 202.
42.

See SCOTT VEITCH, EMILIOS CHRISTODOULIDIS & LINDSAY FARMER, JURISPRUDENCE:

THEMES AND CONCEPTS 10 (2012).
43.
Authority is what Spinoza expressed as "potestas (the rightful power of rule)," in
opposition to "potentia (the actual power of government to achieve objectives)." See MARTIN
LOUGHLIN, FOUNDATIONS OF PUBLIC LAw 164 (2010). It is a matter of political right, for it
concerns "the conviction that there is a mode of right-ordering of public life that free and equal
individuals would rationally adopt." Id. at 158.
44.
Veitch et al. provide an account of power that adds some normative clarity to Dahl's.
They explain power as "being able to affect some other persons, groups or entities in their
reasons for acting and indeed in how they act," which is done "by manipulating in some way the
reasons in response to which other people govern their actions." VEITCH ET AL., supra note 42, at
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It is in the latter realm of authority that the inquiry regarding
the responsibilities of Internet intermediaries should focus. From
where does the authority of intermediaries stem? How does it
influence people's reasons for action? What are the commitments it
demands from intermediaries? Only by attending to these questions
can a richer deontological account be provided of how, in attending to
reasons, intermediaries can attend to the values instantiated in them.
Part III engages with these questions. For now, it is enough to
note that the power invested in Internet intermediaries is normative
in two ways. On one hand, it is normative as in the extended
definition provided by Veitch et al., 45 for such a power entails the
ability to affect people's reasons for action and, most importantly, to
affect how these reasons ultimately become stabilized in a certain
institutional normative order. 46 On the other hand, the power of
intermediaries is normative because it rests on a specific normative
base: the authority of intermediaries as designers of technological
artifacts. 47 Ultimately, it is the normative authority of Internet
intermediaries that is so important for this analysis-and the source
of their responsibility.
To be fair, while attending to this normative dimension is
fundamental to ensuring coherence between the responsibility of
intermediaries and the normative order as a whole, it is also
understandable that courts and the literature would tend to approach
the problem of liability from a markedly consequentialist lens. After
all, there is great consequence in the actions undertaken by
intermediaries. Intermediaries are the designers of the heart valves
through which the lifeblood of our information environment flows.
Actions they take or refrain from taking can fundamentally alter
medium and message, structure and content of information we impart
and receive. In other words, intermediaries can transform the very
constitution of the environments we inhabit and the lives we live
48
therein.
See id.
See NElL MACCORMICK, INSTITUTIONS OF LAW: AN ESSAY IN LEGAL THEORY 289
(2007) (on the idea of law as institutional normative order).
47.
See discussion infra Section III.A.
48.
That the nature of the information environment is indeed so malleable or, as has
been said, "plastic," has been the foundation of policy proposals for leveraging regulation by law
through its relations with code-in other words, law can regulate behavior indirectly by
regulating the code of computer programs. The point has been made, originally, in Joel R.
Reidenberg, Lex Informatica: The Formulation of Information Policy Rules Through Technology,
76 TEXAS L. REV. 553, 553 (1998), and developed in LAWRENCE LESSIG, CODE AND OTHER LAWS
OF CYBERSPACE 90 (1999); see also James Grimmelmann, Regulation by Software, YALE L.J.
1719, 1723 (2005) (explaining plasticity as the idea that "[p]rogrammers can implement almost
any system they can imagine and describe precisely").
45.
46.
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Thus, it may be natural that the scholarly literature on the
regulation of intermediaries' activities would display particular
concern with the factual outcomes that these activities enable (rather
than with their normative foundations). Particularly symptomatic of
this concern has been the literature treating intermediaries as
gatekeepers-openers or closers of gates for the performance of
functions whose normative bearings seem to be entirely detached from
those of intermediaries themselves. This way of thinking has also
been reflected in the different legal approaches that Part II examines.
The foundational legal work on gatekeeping is Reinier
Kraakman's, 49 which describes how regulators can take advantage of
gatekeepers' privileged positions in order to achieve particular
regulatory outcomes. Kraakman's primary concerns are "issues of
practicality and cost" entailed in ascribing liability to gatekeepers. 50
He defines gatekeeper liability as that "imposed on private parties
who are able to disrupt misconduct by withholding their cooperation
from wrongdoers. '' 51 The focus of the definition is thus on the ability
to disrupt wrongdoing, not on the normative wrongfulness of
cooperation itself; not on the manners in which, in their being wrong
and yet ignored or not cared for by the state and the law,
intermediaries' activities can have a normatively detrimental
significance in our lives.
But intermediaries can have such a
normative effect on how the very values which we live by come to be
articulated in the use plans of our information environment.
Internet-related literature has drawn on Kraakman's approach
to develop a critique of gatekeeper liability based on the negative
externalities that the recognition of liability entails. This kind of
critique finds its best expression in Jonathan Zittrain's writings on the
history of online gatekeeping 2 and the future of the Internet as a
generative platform. 53 Zittrain's concerns regard the innovation costs
both of rendering intermediaries liable for third-party content and of
direct state intervention in defining the technological configurations
that intermediaries (and, ultimately, the Internet grid of computers
49.
Reinier H. Kraakman, Gatekeepers: The Anatomy of a Third-Party Enforcement
Strategy, 2 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 53, 53 (1986).
50.
Id. at 53.
51.
Id.
52.
Jonathan Zittrain, A History of Online Gatekeeping, 19 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 253
(2006) [hereinafter A History of Online Gatekeeping].
53.
JONATHAN ZITTIRAIN, THE FUTURE OF THE INTERNET: AND HOW TO STOP IT (2008);
Jonathan Zittrain, The Generative Internet, 119 HARV. L. REV. 1974 (2006) [hereinafter The

Generative Internet]. Generativity, as Zittrain defines it, is the "overall capacity [of a technology]
to produce unprompted change driven by large, varied, and uncoordinated audiences"-in turn
creating, in the case of the Internet, the conditions for innovation and creative endeavors of all
kinds. Id. at 1976.
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itself) should adopt. For Zittrain, the best way forward is that
currently in place in the United States 54-- namely, to approach
intermediary liability for wrongdoing as a matter of corporate social
responsibility, essentially a good Samaritan defense, through which
Internet intermediaries are welcome but not duty-bound to make calls
on the legality or illegality of online content.
One reason given by Zittrain is the usual one-friction that
could arise for innocent third parties as intermediaries would tend to
"overblock content in an attempt to avoid any possible suggestion of
liability."55 Beyond that, intermediaries of services such as chat rooms
or message boards, incapable of coping with monitoring costs, could be
induced to either "shut down entirely" or "to raise drastically the cost
for their services." 56 All these explanations, however reasonable they
may seem at first sight, can only go so far. One still needs to point to
more fundamental reasons as to why it would be a problem if the lives
of intermediaries were made more difficult by the ascription of duties
of care; or what wrong would there would be if intermediaries,
incapable of catering to the dignity of the inhabitants of the
information environment, were simply enjoined to shut their doors?
Zittrain's focus is overtly based on John Stuart Mill, 57 whose
utilitarian ideal of the "greatest happiness for the greatest numbers"
has its mirror image in Zittrain's principle of generativity-that is, the
maximization of the "overall capacity [of the Internet grid] to produce
unprompted change driven by large, varied, and uncoordinated
audiences. 58s
The reason why intermediary liability is to be
disapproved of is that it reduces the generative potentials of the
Internet grid; it encourages the takedown of content, the enclosure of

54.
See discussion infra Part II.
55.
A History of Online Gatekeeping, supra note 52, at 262. Zittrain's explanation is
precisely that reflected in the notion of collateral censorship (see supra note 3), which,
collectively, has also been commonly referred to in the literature as the problem of "chilling
effects." See, e.g., Christian Ahlert, Chris Marsden and Chester Yung, How 'Liberty' Disappeared
from Cyberspace: The Mystery Shopper Tests Internet Content Self-Regulation (Program of
Comparative Media Law and Policy, University of Oxford, Research Report, 2004) and Jennifer
M. Urban and Laura Quilter, Efficient Process or "Chilling Effects'? Takedown notices under
section 512 of the Digital Millennium Copyright Act, 22 SANTA CLARA COMP. & HIGH TECH. L.J.
621 (2006) (for empirical works describing the real-world tendency of intermediaries' taking
content down when confronted with possible liability).
56.
A History of Online Gatekeeping,supra note 52, at 261-62.
57.
See ZIT'tRAIN, supra note 53, at 90 ("Famed utilitarian John Stuart Mill may have
believed in the greatest happiness for the greatest number, but he was also a champion of the
individual and a hater of custom. He first linked idiosyncrasy to innovation when he argued that
society should 'give the freest scope possible to uncustomary things, in order that it may in time
appear which of these are fit to be converted into customs.' He then noted the innate value of
being able to express oneself idiosyncratically ....
").
58.

The Generative Internet, supra note 53, at 1980.
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platforms, and overall discourages the possibilities of participation in
activities from which content-and happiness-emerge.
There are ways in which Zittrain's argument may seem to hint
at a deontological approach, such as when he implies a connection
between online collaboration and the value of friendship.5 9 In this
regard, he draws on literature that similarly sees cultural processes
on the Internet as enlarging our democratic practices beyond earlier
modes of political participation. 60 Yet, neither this literature nor
Zittrain's work seems to see any more ambitious role for politics in
regulating the content of such practices.
Benkler, for instance, is concerned with how the state can
preserve the structural conditions for different forms of
collaboration-forms which have empowered us beyond any measures
we could have conceived under modes of production of the past. Yet
for Benkler, this concern should not translate into a concern for
content itself. On one hand, Benkler criticizes liberal theories that
deal with content as a black box-and which are concerned with
autonomy from only a formal perspective. More specifically, he argues
"theories that ignore culture" 61 "are rendered incapable of answering
some questions that arise in the real world and have real implications
for individuals and polities."6 2 Thus, it is important for liberal theory
to attend to the "practical cultural life" of the information
environment and make judgments on which environmental conditions
are "more or less attractive from the perspective of liberal political
theory." 63 Liberal theory must do so by looking into the "structure of
the information environment" not as something that merely
contributes to our personal autonomy, but rather as something that

59.
See ZITTRAIN, supra note 53, at 92 (noting that "the joy of being able to be helpful to
someone-to answer a question simply because it is asked and one knows a useful answer, to be
part of a team driving toward a worthwhile goal-is one of the best aspects of being human, and
our information technology architecture has stumbled into a zone where those qualities can be
elicited and affirmed for tens of millions of people").
60.
See William W. Fisher III, Theories of Intellectual Property, in New Essays in the
Legal and Political Theory of Property 169-73 (Stephen R. Munzer ed., 2001); see also YOCHAI
BENKLER, THE WEALTH OF NETWORKS: HOW SOCIAL PRODUCTION TRANSFORMS MARKETS AND

FREEDOM 15, 276 (2006) (drawing on, inter alia, Jack Balkin, Digital Speech and Democratic
Culture: A Theory of Freedom of Expression for the Information Society, 79 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1
(2004), to explain how the information environment enables the emergence of a democratic, for
self-reflective and participatory, culture); Sonia Katyal, Between Semiotic Democracy and
Disobedience: Two Views of Branding, Culture and Intellectual Property, 4 WIPO J. INTELL.
PROP. 50 (2012) (invoking John Fiske, Television Culture (1998) to speak about the idea of a
"semiotic democracy").
61.

BENKLER, supra note 60, at 280.

62.
63.

Id. at 285.
Id. at 281.
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constitutes our possibilities of self-authorship. 64 On the other hand,
this perspective should not commit the state to a "program of positive
liberty,"65 it "calls for no therapeutic agenda to educate adults '66 and
invites the state to a "systematic commitment to avoid direct
intervention in
cultural exchange." 67 As Benkler sums up:
"Understanding that culture is a matter of political concern even
within a liberal framework does not... translate into an agenda of
intervention in the culture sphere as an extension of legitimate
decision making. Cultural discourse is systematically not amenable to
68
formal regulation."
Yet, not all problems in the information environment can be
resolved within the internal life of its culture-auspicious though this
culture may, for the most part, be. Much of Wikipedia's content is
gendered
and
politically,
geographically,
and
linguistically
disproportionate 6 9 -or generally just the product of an unjust model of
authority. 70 Google, though it has matured as a principled company
(in fact a subsidiary of Alphabet), is not (and cannot be) the
democratic utopia it may have appeared to Benkler in 2006.71 And
then there are the bullies, the scorned, the vengeful; there is the
privacy infringing, defamatory, and overall offensive content users
find everywhere on the Internet. Offensive Internet practices may at
times be simply bad, in terms of violating our conceptions of the good.
At other times, they amount to wrongs, violating our sense of what is
right-and, indeed, our rights.
One may think state action and responsibility itself should be
determined by the crossing of a threshold between both these

64.

Id. at 146.

65.

Id. at 141.

66.

Id. at 151.

67.

Id. at 298.

68.

Id.

69.
See Mark Graham, Wiki Space: Palimpsests and the Politics of Exclusion, in
CRITICAL POINT OF VIEW: A WIKIPEDIA READER 269-82 (Geert Lovink & Nathaniel Tkacz eds.,
2011).
70.
See Mathieu O'Neil, Wikipedia and Authority, in Lovink & Tkacz, supra note 69, at
309-24.
71.
See, e.g., Michael Luca, Timothy Wu, Sebastian Couvidal, Daniel Frank & William
Seltzer, Does Google Content Degrade Google Search? Experimental Evidence (Research Report,
2012), http://www.slideshare.net/lutherlowe/wu-1 [https://perma.cc/GJC7-5MNL] (explaining how
Google reduces consumer welfare by displaying its own content instead of content from other
platforms); see also Frank Pasquale, Paradoxes of Digital Antitrust: Why the FTC Failed to
Explain Its Inaction on Search Bias, HARV. J.L. & TECH. OCCASIONAL PAPER SERIES, 14 (2013),

http://jolt.law.harvard.edu/antitrust/articles/Pasquale.pdf
[https://perma.ce/BZ9W-23GC]
(questioning the inconclusive end of an investigation of Google's practices by the Federal Trade
Commission. In Pasquale's precise indictment, "the bottom line is that a black box investigation
exonerated a black box search engine").
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categories. Or we may think, as this author does, that the threshold
lies somewhere else. Joseph Raz's theory of autonomy, on which
Benkler himself undecidedly draws, holds that the state is called on to
act whenever the conditions for our personal autonomy are
undermined-whenever social forms of harm leave us without a
meaningful range of options based on which to author our lives. These
special cases of harm may involve harm to the feelings, as long as such
harm, as other forms of harm Raz is concerned with, has the
"forward-looking aspect" of "diminishing our prospects", of "adversely
72
affecting our possibilities."
Be that as it may, it is important to recognize that a threshold
73
exists above which responsibility ought to be checked by state action.
Such a threshold may concern the structure of the information
environment (for example, excessive intellectual property structures
may undermine freedom of expression, and the unavailability of
interoperability arrangements may lead to Internet users' lock-in
under certain platforms) or, as noted, it may concern the very texture
of its content. To blackbox content tout court is as problematic as to
blackbox structure. Yet, albeit political concern ought to involve all
sorts of harmful action capable of impairing our personal autonomy, it
does not matter so much to the argument if we circumscribe our
discussion in this Article to harms to fundamental rights. In this
sense, to admit that, solely to foster and benefit from a culture of
generativity and collaboration regarding content, politics should leave
violation of rights such as those of privacy and reputation outside of
its scope is something that can only be justified on purely utilitarian
grounds.
This author suspects neither Zittrain nor Benkler would
disagree on this last point-and indeed, that they would recognize the
role of the state at least (if only for the time being) in the upholding of
rights. Yet, for reasons this Article will soon examine, the upholding
of rights cannot take place if we are to exclude the responsibility of
certain actors-including that of Internet intermediaries-towards the
very normative order that ensures the recognition of those rights. It
follows that to exclude intermediary liability where the violation of

72.
See RAZ, supra note 24, at 413-14. This does not mean that state coercion is always
the response. For Raz, coercion is to be used only in extreme cases of interference with personal
autonomy. See id. at 421 (noting that "coercion can be used to prevent extreme cases where
severely offending or hurting another's feelings interferes with or diminishes that person's
ability to lead a normal autonomous life in the community. But offence as such should be
restrained and controlled by other means, ones which do not invade freedom").
73.
At least, and I am ready to make this concession, while Internet culture itself does
not develop institutions that perform and replace the legislative and adjudicatory roles the
institutional normative order of the state has served us with so far.
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rights is at stake cannot be justified unless on utilitarian
grounds-grounds that regret the demise of certain undertakings for
purely innovation-related reasons.
To condone the conscious
leveraging of speech that degrades or debases the standing of
individuals and groups cannot happen if not by insulating those who
leverage such speech from the deontological commitments that fall
upon all of us. Regardless of the fleeting utility reflected in speech
outcomes, this part of Internet culture-the role of Internet
intermediaries in upholding the basic commitments of the normative
order-ought also to be amenable to regulation.
II. THE NORMATIVE DETACHMENT OF
INTERNET INTERMEDIARIES

Upholding rights as a basic commitment of our normative order
demands an attentiveness towards the normative order itself. It asks
that we think about the reasonable boundaries of the rights we seek to
uphold and of how best to articulate them in light of competing
normative considerations. Can intermediaries be detached from this
commitment that connects all of us? What would be the justice
implications of such a detachment? And if intermediaries indeed are
so detached, if they have no commitments whatsoever towards the
upholding of rights, if they are lifted up from the relations of
correlativity that otherwise obtain among people in a society, and if
they commit no torts, what then grounds their obligation of abiding by
a court order enjoining them to take content down? Out of what legal
relationship would such an obligation emerge?
These are all questions that Part III addresses, and they are
questions that law has ignored so far. Before we engage with them,
and in order to do so, it is important first to understand how legal
development in this regard has taken place so far, with respect to two
fundamental rights-reputationand data privacy. And while there is
plentiful literature on different aspects regarding Section 230 of the
Communications Decency Act, 74 this author trusts we have much to
benefit from engaging with jurisprudence in the common law and the
law of the European Union in relation to such rights. Put into
perspective, the dynamics in this important jurisprudence enable us to
visualize the kind of pendular movement between outcome-based
extremes referred to in Part I-a kind of movement that ignores the
gravity of the reasons between these extremes. Understanding these
dynamics allows us to reclaim our center of normative gravity and
inquire upon the reasonable boundaries of intermediary liability.
74.

See Reidenberg et al., supra note 11, for a comprehensive survey of this literature.
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A. Defamation:Reputation Between Extremes
One who reads into the momentous Leveson Inquiry into the
culture, practice and ethics of the press is left with two immediate
impressions on the problem of intermediary liability. 75 The first is
that, rather than a central normative problem of our time,
intermediary liability is a lesser issue. To illustrate, out of the 1,800
pages of Lord Justice Leveson's report, less than one and a
half-paradoxically titled "The Relevance of the Internet"76-- have
been dedicated to Internet actors altogether. The second impression is
that the problem of liability arises in an "ethical vacuum," readers are
told, for "the internet does not claim to operate by express ethical
standards" 77-as if its actors were one and the same, and entirely
disconnected from the normative universe we inhabit.
Recent
modifications in English defamation law, brought about by the
Defamation Act 2013, have all but extinguished the liability of
Internet intermediaries, even for the hosting of content they know to
be libelous.
In this sense, they have transformed Lord Justice
Leveson's hyperbolic observations into a normative directive to live by.
It turns out then that, for the time being, the matter is settled in the
laws of England that the normative stance adopted by an Internet
intermediary with regard to defamatory content it hosts is none of the
law's business.
The emptiness of such perceived or constructed normative
universes is akin to that of utilitarian theories examined in the
preceding Section. But this emptiness is also a mirror image of
another normatively extreme universe, namely that instituted by
regimes of strict liability for Internet intermediaries which, just
months before the new Defamation Act, had been affirmed by the
Court of Appeal in a very important decision, whose content and
procedural history are important for us to understand.
Tamiz v. Google78 was the first case concerning the liability of
an Internet host to reach the Court of Appeal. The case involved the
publication of defamatory comments in a blog (hosted by Google's

75.
See Press 'Need to Act' After Leveson (Dec. 5, 2012), http://www.bbc.com/news/uk15686679 [https://perma.cc/JQE9-N69A]. Established in the wake of News of the World
phone-hacking scandal in the United Kingdom, the Leveson Inquiry 'looked at the relationship
between the press and the public, including phone-hacking and other potentially illegal
behaviour, and at the relationships between the press and the police and the press and
politicians."
76.
The Leveson Inquiry: An Inquiry into the Culture, Practice and Ethics of the Press,
2012, H.C. 780-I, Vol. II, at 736 (U.K.).
77.
See id.
78.
Tamiz v. Google Inc. [2013] EWCA Civ 68 (QB) (Eng.).
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Blogger.com), regarding a Muslim Conservative Party Candidate in
local elections in Thanet, an administrative district of Kent. Mr.
Tamiz had previously, and admittedly, behaved in an unbecoming
way, calling local girls "sluts" in a Facebook post, which eventually led
him to withdraw his candidacy in the elections. Yet, the comments
involved in the case went far beyond the Facebook episode, imputing
serious crimes to Mr. Tamiz without provision of any corresponding
evidence. They claimed Mr. Tamiz was a drug dealer and that he had
stolen from a former employer.7 9
Most importantly, Google had been notified of the existence of
such comments and failed to take action within any reasonable time.
In spite of Google's inaction, Justice Eady, ruling the case at the High
Court, expressed agreement with Google's arguments that, since "the
blogs on Blogger.com contain.., more than half a trillion words and
250,000 new words are added every minute... , it is virtually
impossible for the corporation to exercise editorial control over
content."80 Google's position, Eady concluded, was no different from
that of an Internet access provider like British Telecom,81 which Eady
himself had held not to be liable in an earlier case-Bunt v. Tilley.8 2
One must contrast, though, the situation in Bunt with the one
in Tamiz. Unlike a blogging platform, an Internet access provider
does not get into contact with data it routes for longer than a fraction
of a second (let alone the fact that such data is typically split into
packets by Internet protocols; only deep packet inspection techniques
could reveal its content).8 3 Accordingly, in Bunt, Eady stressed the
importance of focusing on the state of a defendant's knowledge-"on
what the person did, or failed to do, in the chain of
communication"8--as an important factor in ascertaining liability.
Taking that factor into account, the implications of Eady's decision in
Tamiz, if upheld, would have been profound. If not even a host such
as Blogger.com could be held liable for content it knowingly

See id. at 7.
Tamiz v. Google Inc. Google UK Ltd. [2012] EWHC 449 (QB) [35] (Eng.).
81.
Id. at 39 ("As I understand the evidence its role, as a platform provider, is a purely
passive one. The situation would thus be closely analogous to that described in Bunt v. Tilley and
thus, in striving to achieve consistency in the court's decision- making, I would rule that Google
Inc. is not liable at common law as a publisher.").
82.
Bunt v. Tilley & Ors. [2006] EWHC 407 (QB) (Eng.).
83.
Under the European Directive on Electronic Commerce and its UK Regulations,
Internet access providers can be classified as mere conduits-simply put, actors whose service
consist in the passive transmission of information in a communications network. They neither
initiate the transmission by themselves, nor select the receiver, nor select or modify the
transmitted content. See Council Directive 2000/31, supra note 22, Art. 12; see also Electronic
Commerce (EC Directive) Regulations, S.I. 2002/2013 § 17 (2002) (Eng.).
84.
See Bunt EWHC 407, at 21.
79.
80.
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hosts-note that here the demonstrated mental element is, cases of
malice aside, as strong as it can be without attaching liability under
the Defamation Act of 2013-then no internet intermediary would
ever be able to be held liable again.
This position would have contradicted the statutory framework
of the European Directive on Electronic Commerce, which states that
a host cannot be exempted from liability for not acting expeditiously in
cases where it has actual knowledge of unlawful activity or
information it hosts. 8 5 Jurisprudence of the Court of Justice of the
87
European Union8 6 as well as regulations in the United Kingdom
indicate the existence of notification by a user is generally a fact which
courts must take into account in deciding whether actual knowledge
has been established.
Fortunately, to some extent, Eady's decision was overturned by
the Court of Appeal, which endorsed the position of an earlier case
also concerning Blogger.com, 8s where the High Court had held that
"following notification [an intermediary] would be unable. . . to
establish that it was ignorant of the existence of the defamatory
material.'8 9 The position in Tamiz has been reflected in a relatively
recent case in Hong Kong, whose wording is also relevant to our
discussion. There, the Court of Final Appeal held that a host (in that
case, the operator of a popular online forum) could only have a defense
"if it was established that, upon obtaining knowledge of the content, he
promptly took all reasonable steps to remove the offending content from
circulation as soon as reasonably practicable." 90
The expressions in italics are remarkably important. They
announce why such decisions have only been fortunate to some extent.
The reason is that courts have held that liability should accrue simply
from knowledge of the content or material that turns out to be
defamatory-along with failure by the intermediary in taking
reasonable steps to remove it. For the courts, this would be enough to
preclude the application of a defense traditionally available in the law
of defamation, which is that of the innocent disseminator-namely,the
person who, not being a commercial publisher (or author or editor of
the content), takes reasonable care in relation to the publication, and
85.
See Electronic Commerce Directive, supra note 22, Art. 14.1(a).
86.
See L'Or6al SA v. eBay Int'l AG, 2011 E.C.R. 1-6011,
122.
87.
See Electronic Commerce (EC Directive) Regulations, supra note 83, § 22(a).
88.
Davison v. Habeeb & Ors. [2011] EWHC 3031 (QB) (Eng.).
89.
Id. at 46.
90.
Oriental Press Group and Another v. Fevaworks Solutions Ltd. [20131 16
H.K.C.F.A.R. 366, 401(H.K.) (emphasis added); see also Metropolitan International Schools Ltd.
(t/a Skillstrain and/or Train2game) v. Designtechnica Corporation (t/a Digital Trends) & Ors.
[2009] EWHC (QB) 1765,, infra note 121.
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does not know or has reason to believe that her actions contributed to
the publication of a defamatory statement. 91 Intermediaries are not
able to avail themselves of such a defense if knowledge of the content
is established. If the content turns out to be defamatory, their liability
automatically ensues.
In other words, the liability of Internet
92
intermediaries is one of a strict kind.
Yet, there is significant distance between knowing that content
exists and knowing that it is illegal. In establishing that liability
flows strictly from knowledge of illegal content, those decisions fail to
create the conditions that address the huge difficulty that at times
exists in inquiring into illegality itself. Unable to carry out such an
inquiry with a sword of Damocles above their heads, Internet
intermediaries would, more often than not, just automatically act to
take everything down. This is thus the extreme situation that part of
the law would currently have us in-the extreme of automatic liability
ensuing from the mere knowledge of the content, regardless of a
93
responsible, albeit mistaken, conviction about its legality.

91.
In England, such a defense, of common law origin, is incorporated in Section 1 of the
Defamation Act 1996, applicable at the time to the operators of websites-a situation which, as
noted above, has been transformed by the new provisions of the Defamation Act 2013. See
Defamation Act 2013, c. 26 § 5 (Eng.).
92.
See Godfrey v. Demon Internet Limited [1999] EWHC 244 (QB) [26] (Eng.).
93.
This is also the situation in one area to which Section 230 does not apply in the
United States, namely obscenity. It is worth appreciating the reasons why that is so. In Hamling
v. United States, 418 U.S. 87, 120 (1974), a case involving the crime of mailing nonmailable (in
the case, obscene) material, the Supreme Court understood, in reference to Rosen v. United
States, that the offence was complete when the paper "was deposited in the mail by one who
knew or had notice at the time of its contents," even though "the defendant himself did not
regard the paper as one that the statute forbade to be carried in the mails." Rosen v. United
States, 161 U.S. 29, 41 (1896). Two reasons are particularly important to compare with our
discussions. First, the Court noted that the "evils that Congress sought to remedy continue and
increase in volume if the belief of the accused as to what was obscene, lewd, and lascivious was
recognized as the test for determining whether the statute had been violated." Id. at 41-42. The
other, which the Court brought from United States v. Wurzbach, 280 U.S. 396, 399 (1930), was
conveyed in the following terms: "Wherever the law draws a line there will be cases very near
each other on opposite sides. The precise course of the line may be uncertain, but no one can
come near it without knowing that he does so, if he thinks, and if he does so it is familiar to the
criminal law to make him take the risk." Id. at 124. Now, while defamation, besides a tort, is also
a criminal offence, it is worth inquiring if, from the perspective of Internet intermediaries, the
kind of speech they are dealing with here is, albeit offensive, similar in kind to the "evils" the
Court referred to in Hamling-which involve the witting purveyance of obscene material to
minors, 47 U.S.C. Section 223(1)(B)(ii) (2013), or the transmission of material which is obscene or
child pornography "with the intention to abuse, threaten or harass another person." 47 U.S.C. §
223(1)(A) (2013). The legislative intention itself implies otherwise, for in cases concerning
defamation intermediaries were completely shielded of responsibility, an outcome that itself may
be undesirable in the light of our argument. More generally, though, we may wish to consider
whether, even in the case of obscenity, the general argument of this Article should continue to
apply-and whether it is fair in either case, both of profound normative indeterminacy, "to make
[intermediaries] take the risk."
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It was in seeking to remedy outcomes like this that the
Defamation Act 2013 moved to the diametrically opposite position of
completely exempting intermediaries-or, in the language of the Act,
operators of websites-of liability for content of their users. 94 The
main condition for this is that the operators must enable the victims of
defamatory materials to ascertain the identity of the users who
publish those materials.9 5 The privacy implications of such a policy
are profound, though they lie beyond the current discussion. What is
important for us to note here is that the move from one extreme (strict
liability) to the other (exemption of liability) has, wittingly or not, the
effect of evading what should be the true focus of our inquiry
concerning liability-a focus on what to reasonably expect from an
operator in ascertaining the legality of the materials. The granularity
of such an approach lies between-and much deeper than-the
extreme and escapist solutions that so far have marked the problem of
intermediary liability.
B. Data Privacy: ForgettingReasonableness
Recent decisions related to the liability of Internet
intermediaries for violation of data protection rights do point to a
more granular approach by recommending a number of criteria that
Internet intermediaries-qua data controllers-should attend to in
assessing privacy complaints. These decisions, however, fall short of
truly recognizing the difficulty of applying the criteria they
recommend. In particular, they provide no indication that, even if
intermediaries try their best in seeking to apply the recommended
criteria, courts will consider their diligence in apportioning-or
exempting them from-liability.
In other words, through the
seemingly granular approach, strict standards of liability continue to
apply.
The most important of such decisions to date is unquestionably
Google Spain,96 where the Court of Justice of the European Union
adopted what would become known, albeit hyperbolically, as the right
to be forgotten. In Google Spain, the court recognized the right of
individuals to have data about them removed from search engine
results whenever such data is processed in incompatibility with
94.
See Defamation Act 2013, ch. 26 § 5 (Eng.).
95.
Id. § 5(3)(a); see Alastair Mullis & Andrew Scott, Tilting at Windmills: the
Defamation Act 2013, 77 MOD. L. REV. 87, 100 (2014) ('"Where posters are not identifiable, the
effect of the Act is to encourage website operators voluntarily to disclose their identity and
contact details.").
96.
Case C-131/12, Google Spain SL v. Agencia Espafiola de Protecci6n de Datos 2014
EUR-Lex CELEX 612CJ0131 88 (May 13, 2014) [hereinafter Google Spain].
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provisions of the Data Protection Directive.9 7 Rather than being an
entirely new creature, the right to be forgotten flows from a right to
erasure that the Directive already explicitly grants data subjects in
particular circumstances. 98 The right to erasure would apply, for
instance, to cases where information about the data subject is
inaccurate, not up to date or, as was the case in Google Spain,
irrelevant. 99 The recognition of the "right to be forgotten" was
expressed in atypically strong terms, as the court affirmed the
supremacy of such a right over not only the economic interests of the
operator of a search engine but also over the "interest of the general
public in finding ... information upon a search relating to the data
subject's name." 100 Such prevalence operates as a general rule, though
in particular circumstances it may be countervailed by a specific
interest of the public to know. In such circumstances, a duty emerges
for data controllers to carry out a balancing exercise between the
public interest and the right to be forgotten. The paradigmatic cases,
noted by the court, are situations in which a data subject plays a role
in public life-a domain which may involve anything from politics and
the arts to the social sphere in general. 10 1
The role played by a data subject in public life, the sensitivity
of the information in question, the age of the data subject, and even
whether the information is defamatory or not-which portrays well
the connection between privacy and defamation 1 02-are some of the
factors that must be taken into account by the data controller in
striking a balance. 10 3 Yet, nothing suggests that, even if it faces up to
all the difficulty in carrying out such a balancing exercise, a data
controller would be exempted from liability. Even if it applies

97.
98.
[hereinafter
99.
100.

Id.
Council Directive 95/46/EC, arts. 12(b),
Data ProtectionDirective].
Id., art. 6.1(c), (d).
Google Spain, C-131112,

14.1(a),

1995 O.J. (L 281) 31 [EC]

97.

(1998),
Right to Privacy,
7,
101.
Id.; see Council Resolution
1165
http://assembly.coe.int/nw/xmlXRef/Xref-XML2HTML-en.asp?fileid=16641&lang-en
[https://perma.cc/9LGQ-SRBN].
102.
This connection presents itself not only via the factoring in of defamation questions
into privacy problems, but also on the other way round. In Grant v. Torstar Corp. for instance,
Abella J. noted that the evaluation of the responsible communication defense in defamation (see
infra Section IV.B) involves "balancing freedom of expression, freedom of the press, the
protection of reputation" as well as "privacy concerns, and . . . the public interest." Grant v.
Torstar Corp., [2009] 3 S.C.R. 640, 701 (Can.).
103.
Art. 29 Data Protection Working Party, Guidelines on the Implementation of the
Court of Justice of the European Union Judgment on "Google Spain and Inc v. Agencia Espafiola
de Protecci6n de Datos (AEPD) and Mario Costeja GonzAlez" C-131/12, 14/EN/WP225 (Nov. 26,
2014),
http://ec.europa.eu/justice/data-protection/article-29/documentation/opinionrecommendation/files/2014/wp225_en.pdf [https://perma.ccKX8C-BPUC].

810

VAND. J. ENT. & TECH. L.

[Vol. 18:4:783

standards going beyond what would be reasonable to expect from an
actor of equivalent economic and technological possibilities, if a data
controller fails to reach, in the view of the court, a correct outcome,
nothing precludes that liability may apply.
In effect, the current language of the Data Protection Directive
requires that, in the presence of any damage resulting from unlawful
processing or any act incompatible with the Directive, compensation is
due. 10 4 A data controller is able to evade liability only by establishing
that he was not responsible for the event giving rise to the
damage 105-wording that, in principle, seems to indicate merely a
notion of causality, rather than one of fault. Romance-language
versions of the respective provision in the Directive appear to
corroborate this interpretation.
They speak of exemption from
liability in cases where the facts leading to the damage are not
imputable to the data controller. 10 6 These versions are not concerned
with the imputation of fault or culpability to the data controller, but
with imputation of the facts themselves.
Yet, however a literal interpretation may seem to indicate the
above perspective, 10 7 it is also a fact that Member States have
incorporated the liability provisions of the Directive in different ways.
Some, including Spain1 08 and France, 10 9 regulate compensation

104.
Data Protection Directive, supra note 98, Recital 55 and art. 23(1).
105.
Id. art. 23(2).
106.
The French version, for instance, reads: "Le responsable du traitement peut 6tre
exonbr6 partiellement ou totalement de cette responsabilit6 s'il prouve que le fait qui a provoqu6
le dommage ne lui est pas imputable." Id. (emphasis added), whereas the Spanish version reads,
equivalently: "El responsable del tratamiento podrd ser eximido parcial o totalmente de dicha
responsabilidad si demuestra que no se le puede imputar el hecho que ha provocado el dao." Id.
(emphasis added). The same goes for the Portuguese and Romanian versions. But see the Italian
version, with text more directly corresponding to the English one: "I1 responsabile del
trattamento pub essere esonerato in tutto o in parte da tale responsabilita se prova che l'evento
dannoso non gli imputabile." (emphasis added)
107.
But see Timoleon Kosmides, The Legal Nature of the Controller's Civil Liability
According to Art. 23 of Directive 95/46 EC (Data Protection Directive) 2, 4th International
Conference
on
Information
Law,
(Conference
Paper)
(May
20-21,
2011),
http://conferences.ionio.gr/icil2Ol2/download.php?f=papers/198-kosmides-full-text-en- vOO.pdf
[https://perma.cc/F28P-KMNG] (noting, with reference to German literature, that the question
concerning the interpretation of Article 23 remains largely unresolved).
108.
See LEY ORGANIGA DE PROTECCI6N DE DATOS DE CARACTER PERSONAL, Art. 19.1.,
B.O.E. n. 298, 43088, Dec. 14, 1999 (Spain) (referring to the general discipline of the C6DIGO
CIVIL, B.O.E. n. 206, 249, July 25, 1889 (Spain)); see also Graciela Rodriguez -Ferrand, Spain, in
THE LIBRARY OF CONGRESS, ONLINE PRIVACY LAW: AUSTRALIA, CANADA, FRANCE, GERMANY,
ISRAEL, ITALY, JAPAN, NETHERLANDS, PORTUGAL, SPAIN, SWEDEN, AND THE UNITED KINGDOM 179
(Research Report) (2012) [hereinafter LIBRARY OF CONGRESS] (pointing to the fault liability
discipline of the C6DIGO CIVIL, Art. 19202, as the applicable regime).
109.
See Douwe Korff, Country Studies: A.3 France, in European Commission,
Comparative Study on Different Approaches to New Privacy Challenges, in Particular in the
Light of Technological Developments 34 (Douwe Korff ed., 2010) (noting that data protection
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matters under traditional fault-liability regimes in their Civil Codes;
others, such as Sweden 11 0 and Italy,'1 1 have introduced provisions in
their data protection legislation pointing to strict liability regimes.
Italy has gone as far as to equate the situation of data controllers to
that of actors who are responsible for dangerous activities * 2-where

responsibility is determined simply if the actor cannot establish he
has adopted all measures appropriate to avoid the damage (regardless

thus of whether his actions had been perfectly legal and compliant
with the relevant standards). 113 The Italian solution is particularly
interesting for this discussion in light of the preceding Section. 11 4 It
provides an understanding into how liability in data protection might
also present itself in a strict form in the United Kingdom-at least if
one is to address intermediary liability consistently across defamation
and data protection cases.
One would be excused in misconstruing the approach chosen by
the United Kingdom for the liability of data controllers as being a
fault-based one. According to the Data Protection Act 1998, a data
controller can evade liability if it is able to demonstrate the adoption
1 15
of reasonable care to comply with the requirements of the Act.
Given the relative scarcity of compensation cases involving data
protection in the United Kingdom, 16 it is difficult to estimate what
reasonable care may actually be.

legislation in France is largely silent concerning remedies, though the general regime of the Code
Civil applies); see also Nicole Atwill, France, in Library of Congress (pointing to the fault based
liability
discipline
of the
Code civil
[C.
civ.]
[Civil
Code] Art.
1382
(Fr.),
http:/flegifrance.gouv.fr/affchCode.do?cidTexte=LEGITEXTO0000607072 l&dateTexte=
20120525 [https://perma.cc/FZ9H-H9P9].
110.
See 49 § PERSONUPPGIFTSLAGEN (SFS 2003:389) (Swed.).
Ill.
See Decreto legislativo 30 giugno 2003, n.196 (It.) (referring to a strict liability
provision of the Codice Civile, Art. 2050).
112.
RICCARDO MAZZON, LA RESPONSABILITA CIVILE: RESPONSABILITA OGGETrIVA E
SEMIOGGETTIVA, 700 (2012) (discussing liability for data protection violation in the general
context of liability for dangerous activities).
113.
Id. As Mazzon explains, according to Art. 2050 of the Codice Civile, it is not enough
for the actor (the "tortfeasor") to demonstrate his conduct or omission has not breached any legal
obligation or standard of care. He has to specifically establish he has employed every measure or
care able to avoid the event. In the absence of these, one must conclude the tortfeasor responds
regardless of whether a mental element (e.g. negligence) is present at all and of whether his
conduct is perfectly legal. All this is a deviation from the general liability rule in the Civil Law
where both illegality and some measure of culpability must be present, as well as from typical
cases of strict liability where, though dispensing with culpability, illegality of the conduct is still
required.
114.
See supra Section II.A.
115.
Data Protection Act 1998, Chapter 20, Art. 13(3) (U.K.).
116.
See PETER CAREY, DATA PROTECTION: A PRACTICAL GUIDE TO UK AND EU LAW 46
(2004) (noting at the time that of the several cases that have reached the courts, most concern
celebrities).
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However, it may be safe to expect case law not to err on the
side of data controllers. On one hand, case law has a tendency, largely
observed in EU jurisprudence, of interpreting data protection
provisions liberally so as to afford more protection to data subjects. In
Google v. Vidal Hall, Lord Justices McFarlane and Sharp, based on
Articles 8 of the Convention and of the Charter of Fundamental Rights
of the European Union, went as far as setting aside a provision of the
Act in order to lift limitations concerning the award of damages for
distress. "The consequence of [setting that provision aside]," their
Lordships noticed, "would be that compensation would be recoverable
under section 13(1) for any damage suffered as a result of a
contravention by a data controller of any of the requirements of the
DPA." 117 This language seems to limit circumstances of compensation
to those in which provisions of the DPA might have been specifically
violated by the data controller. Yet, the tendency of courts not to err
on the side of data controllers may go beyond this limitation.
It may go so because, on the other hand (and why the Italian
provision 18 is interesting), reasonable care by an Internet
intermediary under the DPA may turn out not to be something very
different from damage control by merely taking content down.
Remember, in the defamation cases above, courts have recognized
(also flowing from the general discipline of the Electronic Commerce
Directive) that upon obtaining knowledge that it hosts offending
content, an intermediary needs to promptly take "all reasonable steps
to remove" such a content from its site. 119 Mere failure to take the
content down renders the intermediary responsible for the damage if
the content turns out to be illegal. Hence, regardless of whether or not
the intermediary had failed to live by any standards of legality of care
in assessing the nature of the content, liability would ensue merely
from the fact that the intermediary has failed to take the content
down. The situation in the United Kingdom, in the end, would not be
different from the Italian one-that is to say, a normative extreme
that entirely disregards the nuances of intermediaries' normative
attitudes; a regime that treats all processing of data, the building
blocks of contemporary societies, as dangerous activity.
C. The Emptiness of Normative Extremes
In defamation and in privacy, thus, law and policy have been
transiting from one extreme to the other without pausing to inquire
117.
118.
119.

Google Inc. v. Vidal-Hall & Ors. [2015] EWCA (Civ) 311, [105] (U.K.).
See supra note 111 and accompanying text.
See supra text accompanying notes 93.
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into the reasonable boundaries of what lies between. However, it is
understandable that this is a difficult inquiry. As Eady himself noted
in Mosley v. News Group Newspapers,120 identifying the unlawfulness
of published materials rests on complex variables and is "unlikely to
be ...

clear cut." This is why failure in such an identification is not to

be mistaken for "genuine indifference to the lawfulness of [one's]
conduct." 121 The normative complexity of such a reality should indeed
be attended to by the courts. In data protection as well as in
defamation law, courts should embed in the notion of reasonable care
an appreciation of the difficulties faced by intermediaries in
identifying unlawfulness in Internet behavior-and a cushioning
system to preclude punishment based on identification failures alone.
Some content is more difficult to recognize as unlawful; some
intermediaries have more resources than others for carrying out an
evaluation exercise. The Court of Justice seemed to hint at these
variations in Google Spain by noting that the case should be
appreciated within the framework of responsibilities, powers, and
capabilities of the data controller. In the court's own words: "the
operator of the search engine as the person determining the purposes
and means of that activity must ensure, within the framework of its
responsibilities, powers and capabilities, that the activity meets the
'
requirements of Directive 95/46. 122

That recognition by the court, however, came in a narrower
What the court sought to highlight was that the
context.
responsibilities of search engines should be understood as additional
to-and distinctive from-that of the original websites they index. It
is not altogether clear that the court was proposing any subjective
standard for the understanding of the extent to which one can be
characterized as a data controller. Control remains an either-or
matter, and one to be understood expansively. Either one is a data
controller, and thus falls within the scope of the Directive, or one is

120.
See Mosley v. News Group Newspapers Ltd. [2008] EWHC (QB) 1777, [207], [208]
(UK). http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/sharedbsp/hi/pdfs/24 07 08mosleyvnewsgroup.pdf [https://perma.
cc/24XA-FKUL].
121.
Id. To be more precise, Justice Eady makes a distinction between privacy and
defamation cases (id.), holding the former to be usually more clear cut than the latter-a
conclusion that, I fear, may be in the eye of the beholder. That may help explain his difficulty in
recognizing the same lawfulness challenge as present in defamation cases. In effect, in
Metropolitan v. Designtechnica,what was determinant in Eady's evaluation as to whether Google
had acted with reasonable care was that efforts were being made by Google to take the content
down after notification, that "Google ha[d] taken steps to ensure that certain identified URLs
[we]re blocked." Metropolitan International Schools Ltd. (t/a Skillstrain and/or Train2game) v.
Designtechnica Corporation (t/a Digital Trends) & Ors. [2009] EWHC (QB) 1765, [57]; see also
Grant v. Torstar Corp., supra note 102, at id.
Google Spain, supra note 96, 38.
122.
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not. The notion of control, in other words, does not belong to the
reality of being in control but rather comes up as an expectation
directed to whoever happens to "determine the purposes and means of
the processing of personal data. '1 23 Thus, the definition of data
"controller" by the Directive, is a 'purposive' definition. As noted by
the Court of Justice in Google Spain, what the Directive sought to
accomplish was "to ensure, through a broad definition of the concept of
'controller', effective and complete protection of data subjects. ' 124 That
purposive definition tends now to be reinforced in the General Data
Protection Regulation currently in debate to replace the Data
Protection Directive.1 25 In its latest published version approved by the
Parliament, 126 the Regulation highlights that responsibility and
liability of the controller should be understood in comprehensive
terms, and a data controller should ensure compliance of each
processing operation with the Regulation. 127
Ultimately we are left at two diametrically opposite extremes
in the fields of data protection and defamation. In data protection,
intermediaries stand on very uncertain grounds regarding the
possibility of evaluating complaints related to potentially
privacy-infringing content they host.
In the United Kingdom,
discussed above, the Data Protection Act 1998 prescribes a liability
regime based on a standard of reasonable care. However, taking the
strictures of EU data protection law and jurisprudence into account, it

123.
Data Protection Directive, supra note 98, Art. 2(d).
124.
Google Spain, supra note 96,
34. See also Case C-73/07, Tietosuojavaltuutettu v
Satakunnan Markkinap6rssi Oy and Satamedia Oy, 2008 E.C.R. 1-09831,
48 (on the
requirement of interpreting the Directive in light of its intended effects).
125.
See Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on the
protection of individuals with regard to the processing of personal data and on the free
movement of such data (General Data Protection Regulation), COM (2012) 11 final (Jan. 25,
2012).
126.
Draft European Parliament Legislative Resolution on the Proposal for a Regulation
of the European Parliament and of the Council on the Protection of Individuals with Regard to
the Processing of Personal Data and on the Free Movement of Such Data (General Data
Protection Regulation) (COM(2012)0011-C7-0025/2012-2012/0011(COD)), EUR. PARL. Doc.
TA/2014/212/P7 (adopted in first reading Mar. 12, 2014).
127.
Id. Recital 60. The Draft Resolution also introduces a principle of responsibility and
accountability of the controller, according to which the controller shall implement "technical and
organizational measures to ensure ... the processing of personal data is performed in compliance
with [the] Regulation." This compliance shall be reflected in measures and procedures "that
persistently respect the autonomous choices of data subjects." Interestingly, however, while the
principle of accountability has "regard to the state of the art," it also considers the "type of
organization" and the "cost of implementation." See supra note 125, Art. 22(1) and (la). In this
sense, accountability could possibly open an avenue for interpretations more in light with our
proposal in Part IV-as long as the adopted criteria apply not only to evaluate reasonable care of
content takedown, but also to mitigate the hardship of normative interpretation.
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seems highly unlikely that the legal complexity of a case vis-a-vis the
normative reality of a particular data controller could be accepted as
legitimate criteria in deciding whether the controller has acted
reasonably. For a data controller, then, the final decision to be made
regarding the content is a function of how willing the data controller
will be to take risks in order to protect freedom of expression. The law
speaks against this kind of risk-taking; it designs a normative picture
of "comprehensive" disincentive for a balancing exercise to be freely
carried out.

128

Conversely, the situation in defamation, which had reached a
similarly extreme position in Tamiz v. Google, has since shifted to the
complete opposite side. Whereas in Tamiz intermediaries would be
enjoined to take content down upon acquiring knowledge of it, since
the Defamation Act 2013, Britain has an officially endorsed "snitch
defense"-that is, a full exemption of liability for intermediaries who
are willing to disclose the identity of their users.
Some Internet intermediaries will be more circumspect than
others in how they deal with complaints regarding content. The
recently disclosed numbers concerning decisions made by Google on
the right to be forgotten, for instance, are encouraging. 129 They result
from a thoughtful process that involved the formation of an assembly
of notables, as well as an open consultation carried out in a number of
EU countries, for Google to determine how to deal with right to be
forgotten requests. At a more nuanced level, the systematics (the
thought-processes through which those decisions have been reached)
are so far obscure. We know very little about Google's emerging "case
law," which raises evident democratic concerns. 130 Yet, precisely as
such concerns are raised, a broader picture emerges which reveals
128.
Draft European Parliament Legislative Resolution on the Proposal for a Regulation
of the European Parliament and of the Council on the Protection of Individuals with Regard to
the Processing of Personal Data and on the Free Movement of Such Data (General Data
Protection Regulation) (COM(2012)0011 -C7-0025/2012-2012/0011(COD)),
EUR. PARL. Doc.
TA/2014/212/P7 (adopted in first reading Mar. 12, 2014).
129.
See Sylvia Tippmann and Julia Powles, Google Accidentally Reveals Data on 'Right
to be Forgotten,'THE GUARDIAN (Jul. 14, 2015, 2:28 PM) (explaining that 95 percent of right to be
forgotten requests came from ordinary citizens worried about their own private information-not
from politicians or other public figures. In the relatively few cases those requests came from
public figures, only in a minority of cases (22 percent) have the requests been granted (being
denied in 71 percent of the cases, as opposed to 37 percent of the cases for ordinary citizens'
requests)), http://www.theguardian.com/technology/2015/jul/14/google-accidentally-reveals-rightto-be-forgotten-requests [https://perma.cc/5VJM-KV72].
130.
See Jemima Kiss, Dear Google: Open Letter from 80 Academics on 'Right to be
Forgotten,'
THE
GUARDIAN
(May
14
2015,
09:00
AM),

http://www.theguardian.com/technology/2015/may/14/dear-google-open-letter-from-80-academicson-right-to-be-forgotten [https://perma.cc/9D7V-M977]
(describing letter from academics
"demanding more transparency from Google over how it processes 'right to be forgotten'
requests").
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that the true problem with intermediary liability is not just one of
approaching facts automatically by one side or the other. The problem
with intermediary liability is rather one of creating safeguards that
allow proper normative engagement by Internet intermediaries to
occur in the first place.
In sum, current systems of liability do not carry appropriate
normative safeguards that allow reflective forms of decision making
by intermediaries to take place. Instead, these systems force an
institutional detachment of intermediaries from the normative sphere,
in separation from everybody else. Intermediaries are called on to
simply implement whatever automatic priority the system prescribes.
In systems of strict liability, that priority is for privacy and
reputation; in systems of exemption of liability, the priority is for
freedom of expression. This is not to say normative engagement does
not take place in either case. However, when it does, it happens
against, or laterally to, the institutionalized system-at the cost of
great uncertainty for intermediaries and society as a whole. Thus, an
inquiry into the nature and content of intermediaries' normative
responsibilities is necessary.
III. TECHNOLOGY, JUSTICE, AND RESPONSIBILITY
A. On Design and Use Plans
If Internet intermediaries have a normative responsibility to
engage with content they host, from where does this responsibility
spring? Of what does it consist? How should actors conceive of this
responsibility in a way that attends to the deontological, normative
dimensions that prevailing accounts have failed to pay heed to date?
An answer to these questions must start with a more precise inquiry
into the nature of intermediaries' activities. Up to this point, this
Article has mostly discussed what intermediaries are not, namely
keepers of gates on whose openness or closure they should have no
reasoned, autonomous say.
In alluding to the importance and
consequence of their activities, however, this author had noted that
Internet intermediaries are designers of these pathways through
which information traverses and that their actions can fundamentally
alter structure and content of the information environment. To
understand the levels at which such transformations operate and the
responsibility that ensues, one needs first to understand what it is
that Internet intermediaries design.
In a general sense, Internet intermediaries are designers of
technological platforms; they program their websites and services in
different ways and make choices that are as much a matter of
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business and law as they are a matter of technology.
When
intermediaries enable their technological platforms to host certain
types of content, or to take others down, they define what uses of their
technological platforms are possible or proper-physically and
normatively-and embed such definitions in the language of (and
conceptions about) their software. Those definitions may happen more
generally and spontaneously, at different moments of the life of their
platform, or they may be provoked by specific complaints from an
Internet user or by a court order. But, in each circumstance, a
transformation is intentionally and physically operated in the world of
bits, which, in turn, goes on to influence further uses of the
technological platform and future actions by its users-and their
13 1
reasons for choosing these.
In a more precise way, Internet intermediaries are designers of
technological artifacts-an expression that admits a variety of
definitions as vast as is its importance for us to get right. Among the
different ways to explain technological artifacts, the one that best
illuminates the focus of this Part is that a technological artifact is both
a physical construct and one endowed with a teleological element.
Allusions to this duality are present in more general forms in earlier
accounts 32 but find their best articulation in contemporary Dutch
scholarship on the functions of technological artifacts.
Peter Kroes and Anthonie Meijers, for instance, note that what
distinguishes technological artifacts from other objects is that, beyond
their
physical
dimension,
artifacts
relate
to
"human
intentionality"-"they are objects to be used for doing things and are
[thus] characterized by a certain 'for-ness.' '' 133 They perform functions
prescribed by human intentionality.1 34 Most importantly for this
Article, this teleological dimension expresses itself through "use plans"
by which functions are ascribed to technological artifacts. As Pieter
Vermaas and Wybo Houkes explain, the functions of technological
131.
How reasons are affected by (and reflected in) the design of technological artifact
can be understood by considering the teleological dimension of artifacts, which is explained from
the subsequent paragraph above.
132.
See, e.g., LESSIG, supra note 48 (making an analogy between computer programs
and the law); see also Langdon Winner, Do Artifacts Have Politics?, 109 DAEDALUS 121

(departing from the work of Lewis Mumford to explain how "technical things have political
qualities"). In the philosophical literature, ideas that technologies determine or "enframe" our
understanding of reality go all the way back to Plato and have found its most powerful
contemporary statement in the work of Martin Heidegger. See Plato, Phaedrus, in 9 PLATO IN
TWELVE VOLUMES (Harold N. Fowler trans., 1925); see also Martin Heidegger, The Question
Concerning Technology, in HEIDEGGER'S THE QUESTION CONCERNING TECHNOLOGY AND OTHER

ESSAYS 3 (William Lovitt trans., 1977).
133.
Peter Kroes and Anthonie Meijers, The Dual Nature of Technical Artefacts, 37 STUD.
HIST. PHIL. SCI. 1, 1 (2006).
134.

Id. at 2.
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artifacts "highlight the physical capacities that play a role within 'use
plans' by which users can attain goals."'1 35 It is an understanding of
what use plans are, who authors them, and what roles they play not
only in prescribing but also in justifying certain functions of
technological artifacts as proper that is of so much importance for our
discussion concerning responsibility.
Use plans are a series of considered actions in which
manipulations of artifacts contribute to the realization of a given
goal. 136 They exist within a normative framework through which the
ascription of functions to technological artifacts is justified. 37 On one
hand, use plans are proposed by designers in normative terms. As
Houkes explains, "[G]ood design involves communication of implicitly
or explicitly designed use plans."'138 Designers are "socially recognized
expert[s]' 139 who privilege ways of using artifacts by communicating
such ways as proper ones. Users must thus have good reasons to go
against recommendations by a designer.
In Houkes's words,
"knowledge of a proper function provides a socially standardized or
default reason for using the artefact for a given purpose.' ' 40 It is not
only a source of normativity, "one reason among many,' 14' but rather
one with "privileged status."'142 On the other hand, the normative
claim to a privileged status entailed in the ascription of a proper
function through a use plan must answer to standards of
143
rationality.
In effect, reasons provided by a use plan are embedded in a
normative network towards which designers have responsibilities. It
is from the lenses of normativity that the functions ascribed to
technological artifacts will be evaluated as reasonable or
unreasonable, proper or improper. If use plans fall short of the
normative expectations they raise (which is always a matter of

135.
Pieter E. Vermaas and Wybo Houkes, Technical Functions: A Drawbridge Between
the Intentional and Structural Natures of Technical Artefacts, 37 STUD. HIST. PHIL. SCI. 5, 6
(2006); see also Wiebe E. Bijker, The Social Construction of Bakelite: Toward a Theory of
Invention, in THE SOCIAL CONSTRUCTION OF TECHNOLOGICAL SYSTEMS: NEW DIRECTIONS IN THE

SOCIOLOGY AND HISTORY OF TECHNOLOGY 155, 168 (Wiebe E. Bijker et al. eds., 2012) (employing
the similar notion of technological frames).
136.
Id. at 6-7.
137.
Id. at 8. Vermaas's and Houkes's theory of function- ascription is thus a justificatory
one.
138.

Wybo Houkes, Knowledge of Artefact Functions, 37 STUD. HIST. PHIL. SCI. 102, 108

(2006).
139.

Id. at 112.

140.

Id.

141.

Id. at 106.

142.

Id. at 111.

143.

See id. at 105.
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threshold), the functions they propose as proper will not be recognized
as such. This dialectic between justification and evaluation engages
both dimensions of technological artifacts, at times emphasising their
physical dimension, at others emphasising how their intentional
dimension interacts with the normative order, thus impinging upon
people's reasons and action. To ascribe to a pencil the function of time
traveling is as improper as to ascribe to it the function of
assassination-and so is any use plan in which these functions find
themselves embedded. In either case, the function ascribed to the
technological artifact will fail to justify itself as a proper one.
Hence, the social responsibility of Internet intermediaries as
designers involves a responsibility towards normative propriety
regarding the functions they seek to ascribe to the technologies they
design. One can approach this normative responsibility from at least
two dimensions. The first, which has been alluded to in this Section,
is
a justificatory dimension.
From this approach, Internet
intermediaries need to be able to speak for the actions that, in
devising and revising their use plans, they program or condone;
intermediaries need to be able to justify their normative attitude
towards their own technologies and the ends these enable. But there
is a second, equally fundamental dimension of normative
responsibility, which this author will call a modulatory one. Similarly
to the law, technologies "mediat[e] between people and the rights
' 144
reasons which apply to them.
This mediation often happens in a tacit way, when use plans
are not explicitly articulated or, as is increasingly the case, consulted
by their addressees. 145 In all such cases, technologies impinge upon
people's
available reasons for
action without normatively
communicating so much. Filtering and manipulation of content by
search engines, insofar as is carried out with regard to unconcealed
criteria, are a clear and powerful example of such normatively implicit
effects. 146 That these modulatory effects of technologies and their use
plans can happen tacitly adds to the concerns they generally raise
regarding personal autonomy and liberal politics in our time.
144.
JOSEPH RAZ, ETHICS IN THE PUBLIC DOMAIN: ESSAYS IN THE MORALITY OF LAw AND
POLITICS 214 (1994).
145.
MARGARET J. RADIN, BOILERPLATE: THE FINE PRINT, VANISHING RIGHTS, AND THE

RULE OF LAW 7 (2013) (discussing the legal consequences of the fact that "most of us don't read
[the forms we sign], and most of us wouldn't understand them if we did," and proposing
remedies).
146.

See FRANK PASQUALE, THE BLACK BOX SOCIETY: THE SECRET ALGORITHMS THAT

CONTROL MONEY AND INFORMATION 92 (2015) (discussing search and control and concluding:
'Internet service providers and major platforms alike will be a major part of our informational
environment for the foreseeable future. The normative concerns associated with their unique
position of power are here to stay").
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Surreptitiousness, however, is only part of the problem. Even when
designers articulate their choices explicitly, network effects 147 in the
information
environment-which
amplify
the
nodality
of
intermediaries 14 8-may still prevent people from acting upon their
judgments concerning intermediaries' decisions. Think, for instance,
of Facebook and the relative powerlessness of individuals to move
away from the platform because the whole world is there. Even as it
surfaces that the content shown to people on Facebook may be
directed by manipulation-based research, 149 the effect of people's
judgments on the platform's functions seems to be fairly limited, as its
user-base is unlikely to change in any more significant way.
Choices by intermediaries surely matter beyond their
utilitarian implications. Specifically, these choices matter for how
they affect human values, be it immediately in each case settled or be
it in overarching terms where the whole of intermediaries' decisions
transforms the normative landscape by reference to which we act.
Between May 2014 and August 2015, Google received nearly 300,000
right to be forgotten requests. 150 This statistic is orders of magnitude
above the diminished number of privacy cases settled by courts in the
United Kingdom. A group of global leading privacy experts has
recently released a letter calling for more transparency on right to be
forgotten decisions by Google.151 In their words, "the vast majority of
these decisions face no public scrutiny, though they shape public
discourse. What's more, the values at work in this process will/should
inform information policy around the world."152 To wit, not only
should these values inform policy, but they already do; they have
created a system, reflected in Google's world-enveloping use plans,
with formidable impacts on our normative order.
It seems entirely natural, thus, to demand from Internet
intermediaries a commitment of integrity towards the making of such
normative choices. The use plans they devise should aim not only for
propriety in dimensions of a more emphatically physical nature-from
the aesthetics of user interfaces to the uninterruptedness of
information flows. Internet intermediaries should see to it that they

147.
See generally Carl Shapiro & Hal R. Varian, Information Rules: A Strategic Guide
to the Network Economy 104 (1999) (explaining the idea of network effects).
148.
See supra note 5 and accompanying text.
149.
Katy Waldman, Facebook's Unethical Experiment: It Intentionally Manipulated
Users' Emotions Without Their Knowledge, SLATE (June 28, 2014, 5:50 PM),
http://www.slate.com/articles/health-and science/science/2014/06/facebook-unethical-experimen
t it made news-feedshappier or sadder to manipulate.html [https://perma.cc/J8VF-6T5W].
150.
See Tippmann & Powles, supra note 129.
151.
See Jemima Kiss supra note 130.
152.
Id.
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attend to the propriety of the normative choices they make, both with
regard to each of these choices and to the wider normative community
in which all of them are embedded. This may demand an engagement
with privacy standards, expectations and, ultimately, the law of the
state, which intermediaries ought to pursue at differing levels of
depth, as the circumstances-including their own particular
circumstances-dictate.
B. Justice and Responsibility
From the discussion in earlier Sections, it must be concluded
that the expected commitment towards integrity from Internet
intermediaries ought not to be one of perfection. At the same time,
justice requires that we treat intermediaries as members of the
normative community to which we all belong-which speaks against
the normative detachment that exemption of liability entails. There
are, of course, many different ways of understanding this membership,
as there are many different ways of understanding what justice
requires. If we are to go beyond utilitarian theories, however, at a
minimum this membership should require respect for rights. Now,
respect for rights cannot be turned into a synonym of opaque, episodic,
and non-systematic settling of disputes. Rather, it should entail a
commitment to striving towards normative integrity-with differing
obligations dependent on how capable an actor is of reflecting upon its
interpretations and how these can affect people's lives.
In Right, Regulation, and the Technological Revolution, Roger
Brownsword draws on the work of Alan Gewirth to speak of a
community of rights as the vantage point of a society which accepts
that the "development and application of modern technologies should
be compatible with respect for individual rights." 153
Specific
characteristics of such a community would be an integral and coherent
embeddedness of a formal moral standpoint and its reflective and
interpretive nature, as a community that "constantly keeps under
review the question of whether the current interpretation of its
commitments is the best interpretation."' 154 Justice indeed requires
the embeddedness of all capable social actors in such a reflective
project 155-a project that, ultimately, concerns our pursuit of integrity
153.

Roger Brownsword, RIGHTS, REGULATION, AND THE TECHNOLOGICAL REVOLUTION 24

(2008).
154.

Id. at 25.

155.
This is a notion well understood since ancient times, in the West and in the East.
Comparing the philosophical projects of Aristotle and Confucius, Max Hamburger noted: "The
inseparability of ethics and politics in the Confucian texts first very much reminds us of the
Aristotelian approach. According to Analects, XIII, 3, and the Biography of Confucius, attributed
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regarding the normative order itself. When integrity is not a horizon
in the interpretation and pursuit of society's normative commitments,
no ethical perspective exists that can ground its wider possibilities of
flourishing
Now, to demand commitment towards a common project of
normative integrity from Internet intermediaries is not to substitute
notions of social justice for their autonomy. Rather, to demand such a
commitment is to understand that autonomy itself emerges in-and
cannot be understood outside of-the context of such a shared
normative project. 156 This interpretive or discursive approach towards
autonomy and responsibility is widely recommended in contemporary
political philosophy. Neil MacCormick, for instance, noted that our
moral positions emerge "through a taking of individual responsibility
for a body of moral opinion and tradition" that one initially acquires
heteronomously but continuously reflects upon critically, in
cooperation with others, and that carrying out this discourse is
imperative. 157
As MacCormick explained, "[M]oral deliberation
morally ought to proceed through 'discourse' and can never proceed in
a non-discursive way, by recourse to power-play, rhetorical tricks, or
the like."1 5 It is only then that one "come[s] to a conclusion on the
best view one can form of all the evidence, and in the light of the
whole range of one's moral commitments and beliefs" 1 59-that "one
bring[s] these together into the kind of consistent and coherent set of
practical principles that it befits a rational agent to possess. 16 0

to Szema Chien, Confucius was asked by a sovereign how he would begin if he was put in power
of a country, and answered: 'by establishing the correct usage of terminology, since the proper
use of language and terms does secure order in the state."' This is in line with Aristotle's
contention made in the Politics (1. 2) that man is a political animal and the only animal enabled
by the gift of speech to set forth the expedient and the inexpedient, the just and the unjust. And
in his Rhetoric he remarks that the use of rational speech is more distinctive of human beings
than the use of their limbs (1. 1), wherefore the training in rhetoric is an essential part of civic
education." Max Hamburger, 20 J. OF THE HIST. OF IDEAS 236, 241 (1959).
156.
See JOSEPH RAZ, supra note 24, at 387, 389 (noting that "a person's life is (in part) of
his own making. It is a normative creation, a creation of new values and reasons." Yet, Raz also
notes that people choose their reasons for action amongst social forms available to them, which
they in turn go on to affect. 'The emerging picture," he observes, "is of interplay between
impersonal, i.e. choice-independent reasons which guide the choice, which then itself changes the
balance of reasons and determines the contours of that person's well-being by creating new
reasons which were not there before").
157.

NEIL MACCORMICK, supra note 46, at 251-52.

158.
Id. at 252.
159.
Id. at 251.
160.
Id.; see also RONALD DWORKIN, JUSTICE FOR HEDGEHOGS 12 (2011) (noting that
there can be no neutral grounds on which we can stand on arguments regarding liberty or
democracy, and that we must recognize and demand the exercise of our reciprocal moral
responsibilities. "[M]oral reasoning must be interpretive." He notes, "We must take that
approach to all our moral and political concepts").
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Without a pursuit of coherence, or integrity, in her normative
commitments, hardly can one speak of a person as autonomous. 16 1 In
turn, a society whose individuals fail to engage discursively in such a
pursuit will hardly develop the levels of ethical self-understanding
that are not simply necessary for its flourishing but consanguineous
with it.
Beyond normative matters concerning technologies generally,
there seems to be something particularly consequential in the
normativity of use plans we find in the information environment.
Namely, the functional aspects of these entail, more or less
directly-but always intensely-problems concerning the proper
recognition of human personhood and its contours. Be it because
functions here deal with intellectual goods, or because they bear
directly on people's privacy and reputation, problems of propriety of

design translate as problems of what Seyla Benhabib would call the
"reflexive reconstitution of collective identities."' 162 They affect our
narratives of self-identification as an anchor of our status in public
life. This, in turn, calls for the political community's responsibility
toward the normative implications of the misrepresentation-of the
misrecognition-of our attributes by processes that undermine the
integrity of such narratives. There is, ultimately, a democratic
imperative of recasting our collective narratives under their best
164
light, 163 of attending to the proper fit of our "webs of interlocution."
161.
It is in this sense that Joseph Raz talks about an autonomous person being a person
of integrity. See JOSEPH RAZ, supra note 24, at 382. A person of integrity, for Raz, is a person
who identifies with her choices and is loyal to them. Id. But, of course, identification and loyalty
cannot come without a refined understanding of the very content of such choices. Social
conventions are very important in this regard. Raz, in effect, sees them as constitutive rules, for
they define the practice undertaken by an agent. Id. at 383. Loyalty to them is part of being loyal
to oneself and to one's own choices, everything leading to a complex interplay between individual
choices and social norms. In Raz's words, "The typical role of our decisions and choices, of having
come to care about one thing rather than another, is to settle what was, prior to our
commitment, unsettled. The emerging picture is of interplay between [personal and] impersonal,
i.e. choice-independent reasons which guide the choice, which then itself changes the balance of
reasons and determines the contours of that person's well-being by creating new reasons which
were not there before." Id. at 389.
162.
Seyla Benhabib, THE CLAIMS OF CULTURE: EQUALITY AND DIVERSITY IN THE GLOBAL
ERA 70 (2002).
163.
Id. at 80 ('The goal would be to move a democratic society toward a model of public
life in which narratives of self-identification would be more determinant of one's status in public
life than would designators and indices imposed upon one by others. Call this a postnational,
egalitarian democratic vision of modernist cultural vistas.").
164.
CHARLES TAYLOR, SOURCES OF THE SELF: THE MAKING OF MODERN IDENTITY 36
(1989) ("A self exists only within what I call 'webs of interlocution'. It is this original situation
which gives its sense to our concept of 'identity', offering an answer to the question of who I am
through a definition of where I am speaking from and to whom. The full definition of someone's
identity thus usually involves not only his stand on moral and spiritual matters but also some
reference to a defining community.").
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This wider social responsibility towards a politics of recognition
has not always been so clear in political theory. Traditionally, the
problem of recognition has been presented as one concerning the
reconciliation between gender or cultural groups and the community
as a whole. This issue is particularly apparent in multiculturalist
debates that, though grounded in universalist aspirations, implied a
certain dichotomy between "we" and "the others." Drawing on Fraser,
Benhabib, to contrast, suggested the need of a politics that "accepts
' 16 5
the fluidity, porousness, and essential contestability of all cultures.
That is, problems of recognition should be seen as transcending the
differences and identities of particular groups; while also catering for
these-and in order to do so-they call on us to, more broadly, address
the overarching political framework that concerns our identity
struggles, "by changing our cultural patterns of interpretation,
' 166
communication, and representation."
Struggles for recognition in the information environment are a
paradigmatic example of the importance of this enlarged
understanding of the problem of recognition. The misrepresentation
of individual identities in the information environment is a profound
normative concern for contemporary societies as a whole. As John
Clippinger has powerfully explained,1 6 7 the falsification of identity is
something that happens at great societal costs. 1 68 This is why identity
narratives have been part of the evolutionary strategies of different
species and groups.
"Perhaps," he notes, "we protect identity
narratives so fiercely because so much flows from them: without some
form of foundational narrative for social identity, even in secular
societies there can be no way of securing and enforcing honest
reputations, and consequently, no credible means for allocating social
rights, duties, and privileges." 16 9 Thus, central questions for our
societies include: "How do [we] create the conditions for socially
constructed and enforced honest signaling? How can reputation
signals be credibly communicated and authenticated? ... [H]ow can
new identities be defined and grounded on a global scale?" Ultimately,
he says, "What is required is a new way of framing human identity in
1 70
an open but precise manner."
Clippinger's questions and concerns point to the centrality of
adequate means of identification and recognition for the normative

165.

Id. at 68.

166.

Id. at 69.

167.

JOHN CLIPPINGER, A CROWD OF ONE: THE FUTURE OF INDIVIDUAL IDENTITY (2007).

168.

Id. at 166.

169.

Id. at 168-69.

170.

Id. at 178-79.
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development of our societies. They speak of a social narrative without
whose coherent pursuit no situated understanding of justice and the
conditions of human flourishing is even possible. In the context of the
information environment, answering such questions and concerns
urges us to fine-tune the use plans of our informational artifacts in
order to attend, as precisely as possible, to what our possibilities of
Reinforcing narratives of
self-authorship generally require.
are
involved must be seen as a
self-identification in which all of us
collective responsibility-and one that cannot exclude nodes that are
Internet
so central for our reflection upon such narratives.
intermediaries here are not only responsible; they are particularly so.
They are responsible not only for the generation of utility, but also for
coherently interweaving their use plans with a normative web whose
evaluative integrity so centrally depends on the propriety of those use
plans. We must approach the integrity of this web, in each of its
interpretive nodes, as a public good.
In a work about hate speech whose arguments perfectly
resonate with discussions here, Jeremy Waldron noted that the
visible aspects of a well-ordered society matter as a public good;
wherever the dignity of particular groups is affected by explicitly
articulated forms of prejudice against their members, this public good
is eroded in ways that impair the possibility that people can "live their
lives and go about their business." 171 People need assurances that this
erosion is not going to take place, and this assurance, itself, Waldron
explains,
is like a public good, albeit a silent one. It is implicit rather than explicit, but it is
nonetheless real-a pervasive, diffuse, general, sustained, and reliable underpinning of
people's basic dignity and social standing, provided by all to and for all. A wel-ordered
society, it seems to me, has a systemic and structural interest in provision of this public
arises out of what hundreds of
good .... [T]he public good of assurance depends on and
17 2
thousands of ordinary citizens do singly and together.

While Waldron is concerned with the visible, such an erosion can also
Waldron's
happen in tacit, but not any less pernicious, forms.
environmentalism against public expressions of hatred applies just as
well to invisible ways through which individual and collective forms of
action-or lack thereof-operate to undermine the architectural
assurances of respect for persons and their rights-the architectural
assurances of an information environment whose normative order is

JEREMY WALDRON, THE HARM IN HATE SPEECH 16 (2012).
171.
Id. at 99. In Reynolds v. Times, similarly, Nicholls L.J. noted that "it should not be
172.
supposed that protection of reputation is a matter of importance only to the affected individual
and his family. Protection of reputation is conducive to the public good." Reynolds v. Times
Newspapers Ltd. and Others [1999] UJKHL 45, [2001] 2 AC 127 (HL) 201 (appeal taken from
England).
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deeply rooted in the use plans enacted by Internet intermediaries.
Rather than depending on normative detachment, the assurance that
the information environment will develop as a public good depends on
a sense of citizenship, attachment, and commitment by all social
actors-and some of them particularly-towards an interpretation of
our informational lives that is as good as it can be. Only by taking
responsibility for this shared interpretive project can we respond to
contemporary challenges to human recognition stemming from a
dominantly utilitarian outlook of information flows. The problem is
very real, and Seyla Benhabib captures it vividly in the words below:
We are facing the genuine risk that the worldwide movement of peoples and
commodities, news and information will create a permanent flow of individuals without
commitments, industries without liabilities, news without a public conscience, and the
dissemination of information without a sense of boundaries and discretion. In this
"global.com civilization," persons will shrink into e-mail addresses in space, and their
political and cultural lives will proliferate extensively into the electronic universe, while
their temporal attachments will be short-lived, shifting and superficial. Democratic
citizenship, internet utopias of global democracy notwithstanding, is incompatible with
these trends. Democratic citizenship requires commitment; commitment requires
17 3
accountability and a deepening of attachments.

Benhabib speaks thus about the need for a pursuit of boundaries in
information flows that are grounded in attachments and commitments
between persons, rather than on the fleeting utility of informational
goods. As Waldron's public good of assurance, Benhabib's view of
democratic citizenship is a call for an appropriate recognition of the
normative foundations of speech, which replaces the lack of
accountability and liability that increasingly seems to characterize the
information environment.
The interplay between freedom of speech and democracy has
been most famously explored by Cass Sunstein in the context of the
First Amendment to the US Constitution. The gist of Sunstein's
argument is that, in the American tradition, "[t]he protection accorded
to free speech is designed to allow the polity's judgments to emerge
through general discussion and debate. ' 174 This view, in turn, is not
something to be approached from utilitarian lenses.
Revisiting
Brandeis's famous quote that "liberty is the secret of happiness and
courage ... the secret of liberty," Sunstein notes that "[a] wellfunctioning system of free expression does not simply promote better
outcomes; it also has salutary effects on individual character. '175 In
other words, "the free speech principle should be understood as
benefiting from and helping to inculcate certain personal

173.

BENHABIB, supra note 162, at 183.

174.

CASS SUNSTEIN, DEMOCRACY AND THE PROBLEM OF FREE SPEECH 245 (1993).

175.

Id. at 244.
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characteristics that amount to both collective and individual goods. '176
Yet, for all that to happen, "[a] system of free expression should...
increase the likelihood that political outcomes will be responsive to the
will of the public." 17 7 It further requires that a public discussion be
carried out in "public-regarding terms. ' 178
The purpose of the
American Constitutional system, Sunstein explains, is "not to furnish
the basis for struggle among self-interested private groups, '179 but
rather to engage people in democratic discussion, "to open [them] to
the force of argument,"18 s0 so "to allow the polity's judgements to
1
emerge through general discussion and debate."18
One ought indeed to remember that, whether such a
public-regarding system is established or not, the recognition of
identities and the affirmation of rights will take place through a less
perfect, at times wicked, system of free expression. Good or bad
decisions will be made by Internet intermediaries, as they are made
everywhere.
But they will be so with special gravity here,
intertwining with a larger system of reasons to define the boundaries
of people's rights and possibilities of action in the world. What
Sunstein's system of deliberative democracy reminds us of is that
"respect for private rights, the private sphere, and limited government
should themselves be justified by publicly articulable reasons, and
thus they too will be either the preconditions for or the appropriate
outcomes of a well-functioning deliberative process. '18 2 Deliberative
processes, in other words, shape rights, which, in turn, shape
deliberative processes. The boundaries of our collective agreements
and their public-regarding nature will determine the shape of our
rights. Attending to this is an intrinsic dimension of the recognition
and affirmation of value in the information environment-including
the values of the rule of law and, ultimately, of dignity itself. A
commitment to agreement through this public regarding system ought
thus to be a regulative ideal for politics itself.1 8 3
In The Concept and the Rule of Law, Waldron has similarly
noted that the publicness of legal discourses, that is the imperative
that they be carried out in the name of the public, is an element of the
very idea of rule of law.18 4 It flows from the requirement of generality
176.
177.
178.

Id. at 255.
Id. at 244.
Id. at 243.

179.

Id. at 241.

180.
181.

Id. at 242.
Id. at 245.

182.

CASS SUNSTEIN, THE PARTIAL CONSTITUTION 137 (1993).

183.

Id.

184.

Jeremy Waldron, The Concept and the Rule of Law, 43 GA. L. REV. 1, 31 (2009).
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of public norms, in the sense of reaching all agents equally,
impersonally and publicly, for treating them as capable of
understanding the normativity of rules-for which, in turn, their
responsibility can be demanded 1 8 5 It is only by affirming itself as a
public resource that law can "pay [.. .] respect to those who live under
it, conceiving them now as bearers of individual reason and
intelligence." 18 6
Recognizing this argumentative aspect of legal
practice, the requirement of rendering law susceptible to rational
analysis and participation, is tantamount to upholding the dignity of
187
legal subjects.
It is a requirement of rule of law, democratic citizenship, and,
ultimately, of justice itself that intermediaries are situated as an
integral part of the regulation of our argumentative legal practices.
This requirement ought to be seen as a fundamental aspect of the
fairness and, in everything, of the integrity of the normative life of our
information environment.
It is also currently a regulatory
challenge-a central one in our time-yet a treatable one, beyond the
illusion of automatic choices that, in one direction or another, ignore
values fundamental to one's self-constitution. It is a challenge we can
tackle if only we do not give up. To admit otherwise is to admit the
failure of our moral and political systems and, within these, of the
institutions of law. The programming of our institutions with a
language of impossibility, the embedding of our collective
disappointment in the law and in the very design of the information
environment violates the public good of assurance that things should
be otherwise. As Luciano Floridi remarks, "We live in an improvable
infosphere, where moral agents have a duty to exercise their ethical
stewardship."188 At least when rights are at stake, this moral duty
Floridi speaks about translates into a notion of responsibility. There
can be no privilege in the laws of defamation, privacy, or anywhere
that undoes our collective assurance that we have grounds to stand
with dignity, to live and to improve our lives, and, in all things, to
exist in a society that thrives in a culture of self-respect.
C. Correlativity and Corrective Justice
As noted above, the responsibility of Internet intermediaries
should neither be precluded nor taken to be strict. Rather, it should
reflect a commitment of applying the best efforts reasonable-within

185.

Id. at 24.

186.

Id. at 36.

187.

See id. at 35-36.

188.

LUCIANO FLORIDI, THE ETHICS OF INFORMATION WARFARE 130 (2013).
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intermediaries' particular economic and technological possibilities-to
get the facts and the law straight. It should be expected that
intermediaries will fail, even miserably, at times to reach the best
interpretation that can be reached regarding the disputes they settle.
But this Article also notes that intermediaries becoming
institutionally detached from the normative community-the
community of rights-that we all inhabit is unacceptable.18 9 What
still needs to be examined, even if briefly, is whether our ideas for
addressing the problem of responsibility of intermediaries is coherent
with a broader system of which that problem is an integral part-the
system of corrective justice in private law. This Section takes up this
task. As this author will suggest, not only is our proposal compatible
with the system of corrective justice, but it is also required by such a
system.
Before putting this suggestion forward, a clarification is
necessary. From a theoretical standpoint, this Part has not so far
approached the responsibility of intermediaries from the particular
perspective of corrective justice, of which tort law is a part. Rather, it
has been approaching the problem from the broader perspective of
what may, more simply, be called a conception of normative justice.
Traditionally, following the Aristotelian account, one would divide
conceptions of justice in distributive (concerned with criteria for the
original distribution of resources) and corrective (concerning the
maintenance and restoration of transactional justice). 190
Both
conceptions, as any conception of justice, are normative, 191 though
they approach the question of normativity from different directions.
Corrective justice concerns a relationship between two parties and the
norms inserted in this bipolar relationship. Distributive justice, on
the other hand, encompasses a normative relationship between any
number of parties that may exist within a political system-for, as
just noted, it concerns the original distribution of resources within

189.
See supra Section III.B.
190.
There is wide controversy on the correctness of this division, as well as on the
taxonomical hierarchy between both categories. Brudner and Nadler, for instance, explain
Aristotle himself "viewed transactional justice as embedded within a distributive justice
framework," which appears when he notes, in Nicomachean Ethics, that 'the number of shoes
exchanged for a house must ... correspond to the ration of builder to shoemaker." As the authors
note, the reciprocity required for justice in exchange depends on the equality between (and thus
on the commensurability) of things in exchange-which, in turn, depends on the justice in social
arrangements more broadly, for, in Aristotles words, "it is by proportional requital that the city
holds together." ALAN BRUDNER & JENNIFER M. NADLER, THE UNITY OF THE COMMON LAW 18
n.31 (2d ed. 2013). Although this controversy will not in itself concern us here, the vision of
corrective justice we expound is indeed an embedded one.
191.
See EARNEST J. WEINRIB, CORRECTIVE JUSTICE 17 (2012) ('To think of something as
an injustice is not to refer to a brute event but to make a normative ascription.").
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such a system. This Article so far has been speaking of design, use
plans, and responsibility in a way that seems to refer to the wider
normative constellation that distributive justice entails. Yet, the
Article has in fact been approaching the question of normativity from
a perspective that concerns the conceptions of both distributive and
corrective
justice-at
the
same
time
transcending
the
resource-allocative concerns that mark both of these conceptions.
Our concern has been, in effect, with a conception of justice
that provides assurances, including from an architectural standpoint,
as to a taking of normative responsibility centered on the value of
human personhood. Such is a concern that relates as much to the
normative bonds between two people as it does to those that exist
between people in society as a whole. With this important caveat, let
us now discuss why corrective justice, in particular, requires that we
move beyond the normatively detached approaches of Part II. This
Article then concludes with an explanation of how corrective justice
requires us to approach the responsibility of intermediaries instead.
The important point to be made here concerns the notion of
correlativity-an ideal of normative integrity regarding the reasons
that hold the parties together in a relationship (in our case of
liability), and which makes the intelligibility of phenomena concerning
this relationship dependent on the relationship itself, rather than on
either of its poles. 192 As Weinrib explains, the nature of the wrong in a
relationship of liability-and of the liability itself that corrects that
wrong-"is intelligible only if the doing and the suffering are regarded
as comprising a single normative unit in which each party's position is
the mirror image of the other's. ' 193 This notion of correlativity, in
turn, is irreconcilable with the systems of either exemption of liability
or strict liability that Part II discussed. In a very rough summary, we
can say it is a violation of that notion that, in ordinary situations, one
actor can have a liability without a precise correlation between an
underlying duty towards another actor and that actor's right-and, of
course, without the (wrongful) breach of such a right.
In cases of strict liability, this irreconcilability is more obvious.
Here it is clear that intermediaries risk being held liable over and over
again, without a correlated wrong, for actions-decisions on content
they host-that are of the ordinary nature of their ordinary activities.
Every time intermediaries interpret the nature of content in light of
the law-even when they try their best to respond to enormous
normative uncertainty-liability may accrue. Intermediaries here are
subjected to Sisyphean lives, always rolling the rock up the hill only to
192.
193.

Id. at x.
Id. at xi.
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see it rolling back down-a fate indefinitely removed from their own
normative context. Systems of strict liability thus are unavoidably an
exception to the notion of correlativity between rights and duties that
marks the central cases of private law. They belong to the realm of
ideas that are "not normal ...elaborations of private law" and which
private law incorporates "only for special occasions and with special
justifications."' 194 As John Gardner observes, "In modern legal systems
[liability] is typically strict and conditional, i.e., it is a strict liability
that arises only when one is engaged in certain pursuits, such as
blasting and manufacturing consumer products.
These extra
conditions are needed to meet the problem of institutional fairness. ' 195
Or, in Tony Honor6's view, they are forms of liability that have a place
when the "conduct of the harm doer carries a special risk of harm." 196
Making these exceptions into rules violates the justification of
private law as a normative system, instead turning it into a servant of
the outcomes of factual controversies. It fulminates the normative
coherence 197 and the very self-understanding 198 of private law as a
system, for it institutionalizes a contradiction of this system without
special, deontological reasons-and does so in one of the most
fundamental realms of the law in our time. It is important, thus, to
realign the liability of Internet intermediaries with those that are the
central cases of corrective justice-namely, cases of negligence
liability. These require the existence of wrongdoing, that is, the

194.
Id. at 10.
195.
John Gardner, Obligations and Outcomes in the Law of Torts, in RELATING TO
RESPONSIBILITY: ESSAYS FOR TONY HONORt ON HIS EIGHTIETH BIRTHDAY 125 n.17 (Peter Cane &
John Gardner eds., 2001).
196.
TONY HONORIt, RESPONSIBILITY AND FAULT 27 (1999).
197.
See WEINRIB, supra note 1, at 11-13, 170 (noting "that private law is a justificatory
enterprise that articulates normative connections between controversies and their resolutions"
and that this justification entails a pursuit of internal coherence, in which private law strives "to
avoid contradiction, to smooth out inconsistencies, and to realize a self-adjusting harmony of
principles, rules and standards"-and that, in the common law, this justificatory enterprise
presents itself as an responsibility of "tak[ing] reasons for judgement seriously, as reasons." The
very concepts of private law, "[a]s the products of juristic thinking, . . .are presented to us by
positive law, and they invite us to make sense of them and of their normative dimension." If the
coherence of the system is to be preserved, this is a responsibility that should be extended to
Internet intermediaries).
198.
The normative coherence of private law is also a requirement of its internal
intelligibility, for it is only through the mutual interconnectedness of the different parts of the
system that we can make sense of the system from within, as a self-understanding enterprise.
Conceptual integrity plays a fundamental role here. As Weinrib notes "the concepts of private
law are both products and channels of [its] self-understanding." It is only by reflecting upon the
coherence of these concepts, as well as the doctrines and institutions that instantiate them, that
private law can reflect upon itself and its intelligibility as a system of norms. See WEINRIB, supra
note 1, at 14.
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"failure to live up to the standard of reasonable care" 199-which, in
turn, is marked by a minimum of acceptable risk that connects an
action by one person to the suffering by another. As Weinrib
summarizes, "Throughout, negligence law treats the plaintiff and the
defendant as correlative to each other: the significance of doing lies in
the possibility of causing someone to suffer, and the significance of
suffering lies in its being the consequence of someone else's doing.
Central to the linkage of plaintiff and defendant is the idea of risk, for
risk imports relation. ' 20 0 The centrality of this relation, however, is
undermined in cases where no risk is deemed acceptable, where even
situations of profound normative uncertainty-which exist in many
hard cases intermediaries need to settle-are met with the threat of
liability.
It is precisely the hardship of such situations that defenses and
privileges in defamation law seek to remedy, through the creation of
regimes that attempt to emulate that of negligence liability. So is the
case, for instance, with the innocent dissemination defense, which
embeds a standard of reasonable care in defamation taken from
negligence liability201-even
if this intention is defeated by the
strictness of assuming knowledge of the unlawfulness of the
content. 20 2 One particular set of defenses, however, seems most
successfully apt to tackle the problem of intermediary liability-that
of qualified privilege, known before as the Reynolds defense presently
reflected in Section 1 of the Defamation Act 2013, as the defense of
"publication on matter of public interest." The gist of that defense is
now that factual inaccuracies, which would be normally subject to
liability under defamation law, are to be tolerated under a set of
justifiable normative circumstances.
Specifically, the publication
must be of a matter of public interest and one that the defendant
reasonably believes to be the case.

199.
Id. at 147.
200.
Id. at 168.
201.
It is indeed a system of negligence liability, based thus on a standard of reasonable
care, that the innocent disseminator defense in defamation seeks to replicate. See Emmens v.
Pottle, 16 QBD 354, 357 (1885) (U.K.) on the negligence foundations of the innocent
dissemination defense. See also JAN OSTER, MEDIA FREEDOM AS A FUNDAMENTAL RIGHT 59
(2015); MATITHEW COLLINS, THE LAW OF DEFAMATION AND THE INTERNET 295-96 (3d ed. 2010).

202.
See supra Section I.A (discussing how to the innocent dissemination defense only
exempts one who is not a commercial publisher if he takes reasonable steps to take defamatory
content down upon obtaining knowledge of it, regardless of how difficult it is to ascertain the
defamatory nature of the content).
Reasonable care, in this sense, becomes a purely
factual rather than normative-attitudetowards the content. The same may be said of the safe
harbor provisions of the Electronic Commerce Directive and its Regulation in the United
Kingdom.
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The foundation of the defense of "publication on matter of
public interest" is a notion of reciprocity, which, in turn, instantiates
the idea of correlativity that more generally grounds tort liability. 20 3
Here, this idea means that, where there is "between the maker of the
statement and the recipient [-including the public at large-]some
duty or interest in the making of the communication," 20 4 a general
privilege is recognized regarding the normative conditions under
which the statement is to be made. This privilege, which is an
integral part of defamation law, takes into account all the normative
circumstances connecting both sides of a communication cycle. Some
cases exist in which "the status and activities of certain bodies are
such that members of the public are entitled to know of their
proceedings. '20 5 Here the privilege will derive from the subject matter
alone. Other realms require the totality of normative circumstances to
be considered in determining the reasonableness of one's expectation
of privacy. That is the case in privacy generally, and it also holds true
here: where the reciprocal--or correlative-normative context of the
parties determines whether the "publication on matters of public
interest" defense holds good. These are both very clear instantiations
of the more general idea of correlativity in private law.
Was the responsible communication defense to be applied to
intermediaries, as this Article suggests below, it would instill a sense
of subjective responsibility that redeems the coherence between
intermediary liability and private law in general. Through this
defense, intermediaries would be normatively recast as responsible
members of a self-understanding system that seeks to pursue the best
justifications possible for its decisions in light of the integrity of its
norms. 20 6 Only the granularity of a system of reasons and justification
enables the relationship between intermediaries and the public in
general-a relationship that is ordinary in everything but its
importance-to express itself in appropriately correlative forms.
Correlativity, indeed, depends on the reasonableness of the
commitments that bind both sides together in a relationship. Systems
that establish structures of strict liability to deal with ordinary
situations lift the relationships between parties from the universe of
reasonableness. Their hardship is anathema to the granularity we
should expect from corrective justice. They violate not only the dignity

203.
structuring
204.
205.
206.

See WEINRIB, supra note 1, at xiv (noting that "correlativity constitutes the
idea ... for the correction of the injustice through liability").
Reynolds v. Times Newspapers Ltd. [1999] UKHL 45, [2001] 2 A.C. 127, at 194.
Id. at 196.
See WEINRIB, supra note 191 and accompanying text.
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of the parties in a relationship, but the dignity that the very system of
private law, as a whole, seeks to uphold.
Like general systems of strict liability, general systems of
exemption of intermediary liability also reflect a violation of the notion
of correlativity in private law. This violation expresses itself from two
different perspectives.
The first perspective lies in the idea of
exemption itself and is a mirror image of the violations we find with
strict liability-all the while resting on the same normative
contradictions of strict liability. In general systems of strict liability,
correlativity is violated by a doing away with the requirement that an
action must be wrongful to be a wrong. There is no acceptable
measure of risk in that structure. Insofar as there is risk, any action,
no matter how accomplished (or, indeed, how not 20 7), may be met with
liability. In general systems of exemption of liability, in turn, from an
institutional perspective, no matter how effortless, how morally
wrongful an action may be, there is just no wrong-and thus no
corresponding duty of avoiding it. Any risk is acceptable in this
structure! The conferral of "immunity regarding risks that could have
been modulated ... ignore[s] the effect of one's action on other agents
and ... treat[s] them as nonexistent. '' 20 8 In both general systems, of
exemption and of strict liability, what happens is that the positions of
the intermediary and the user-the doer and the sufferer-are
institutionally lifted from their foundations in a relation of
(acceptable) risk. Without justifiable reasons, an institutionalized
disconnection of the legal position of the Internet intermediary from
the network of correlative positions-and, indeed, from the normative
unity-that characterizes private law is operated. Simply put, there is
no corrective justice. Precisely there is none here where, given the
normative centrality of the actors in question, one would most expect
it.
That this first perspective so far seems to have gone unnoticed
may be due to an institutional gimmick that serves at the same time
as a cloak and, once we attend to it, as an indictment of current
systems of exemption of liability. An example will help to introduce
the point. Consider the language of the Defamation Act 2013, where it
is said, exemption of liability notwithstanding, that "[w]here a court
gives judgment for the claimant in an action for defamation the court

207.
See Gardner, supra note 195, at 4 (noting that strict liability is a mode of liability
"in which the law does not care about care-taking, and therefore does not treat the bestowing of
care-any care at all-as having been obligatory").
208.
WEINRIB, supra note 1, at 152.
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may order ... the operator of a website on which the defamatory
'20 9
statement is posted to remove the statement.
Notice what the Act does here. It recognizes the possibility
that an injunction be granted against a party that is entirely outside
the bonds of the substantive legal relationship brought before the
court. That is so because, let us remember, the Defamation Act 2013
established a system of virtually unqualified exemption of liability for
Internet intermediaries, lifting them from a legal relationship that the
system went on to determine exists exclusively between the author of
the defamatory content and its victim. Now, in allowing for such
injunctions, the system seeks to reconstruct procedurally a legal
relationship that it has extinguished substantively.
This the aforementioned gimmick, and the second perspective
from which current exemption systems ought to be approached as a
violation of the notion of correlativity: the attempt to reconstruct a
legal relationship with a party which, were it not for this
reconstruction, would be completely foreign (for it is exempt) to the
legal relationship brought before the court-that between the original
author of the defamatory material and the victim of the defamation.
What justifies that provision in the Defamation Act-an injunction to
a party that is entirely outside the bonds of correlativity? 210 It could
seem that, once a judgment has been issued, a new relationship is
formed with the intermediary, based on the now-proclaimed illegal
nature of the content. But such a conclusion would be unwarranted.
First, the content would have been illegal all along; it would not have
its nature transformed solely by virtue of the court judgment. Second,
there is no provision recognizing a liability of the intermediary
towards the victim of the defamatory content. If the court order is not
complied with, the remedy will not be a remedy within tort law, but
rather simply one within the realm of contempt. 211 This second point
209.
Defamation Act 2013, c. 26, § 13(1)(a) (U.K.).
210.
In Lord Watson's words in White v. Mellin, "Damages and injunction are merely two
different forms of remedy against the same wrong; and the facts which must be proved in order
to entitle a plaintiff to the first of these remedies are equally necessary in the case of the second."
White v. Mellin [18951 AC 134 (HL) 167 (appeal taken from Eng.)). Yet, no wrong would seem to
underlie an injunction against a third party-and the violation of a court order would rest purely
in the realm of contempt of court.
211.
See Attorney-General v. Newspaper Publishing PLC [1988] Ch 333, at 380 (Sir
Nicolas Browne-Wilkinson noting, for the Court, that witting interferences by third parties with
court orders should be regarded as interference with the process of justice. In his words, "[t]he
third party would be liable for contempt, subject to proof of mens rea, not because he is in breach
of the order, but because he has prevented the court from conducting the proceedings in
accordance with its intention." Sir Browne-Wilkinson did not seem even to be contemplating the
possibility of a third party being reached by an order, and thus being in breach of it. The strange
situation-which is now the ordinary life-of the Defamation Act 2013, however, is an even
clearer case of contempt); see also X & Y v. Persons Unknown [2006] EWHC 2783 (QB), [2007]
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makes it very clear that there are no underlying reasons based on
which a duty for the intermediary may be established. 212
Here it is important to have in mind what John Gardner has
called the continuity thesis in tort law-an explanation for the
secondary obligations tort law is based on and their underlying
rationales. The continuity thesis holds that a secondary obligation in
tort law is a "rational echo of the primary obligation, for it exists to
serve, so far as may still be done, the reasons for the primary
obligation that was not performed when its performance was due. ' 213
In other words, a secondary obligation does not emerge as a mere
consequence of the violation of a primary obligation. It has support in
the underlying reasons on which a primary obligation rests, and which
continue to exist after the primary obligation is not fulfilled. 214 So,
what are the primary reasons on which the requirement that
intermediaries comply with a court order is based? Simply, there are
none.
In exempting intermediaries of liability, the law has
extinguished any possible primary reasons.
Thus, secondary
obligations have no reasons on which to be based.
The power granted to courts by the Defamation Act 2013 is not
founded in the law of torts. It merely addresses a case of injunctions
issued against innocent third parties and seeks to render normal what
is, in fact, an abnormal event. As Basil Markesinis and Simon Deakin
point out, "In principle, an injunction cannot be granted unless it is
based upon some actual or potential cause of action in tort, contract,

EMLR 290 [72] (UK) (noting that the doctrine reflected in Attorney- General v. Newspaper
Publishing PLC, known as the Spycatcher doctrine in reference to Peter Wright's book-at stake
in that case and others-"as a matter of logic, has no application to a permanent injunction
since, obviously, there is no longer any need to preserve the status quo pending a trial." Yet,
there is no similar constraint in the Defamation Act 2013).
212.
Notice, also, that Section 13(1)(a) does not speak of the operator of the website, but
of the operator of a website-which, in principle, seems to enable the court to issue, if not a
contra mundum injunction, at least an injunction to any operator hosting the defamatory
statement.
213.
John Gardner, What is Tort Law For? Part 1. The Place of Corrective Justice, 30 L.
AND PHIL. 1, 33 (2011).
214.
In the world of the Civil Law, these sorts of obligations are known as "natural
obligations." See ROBERT J POTHIER, 1 A TREATISE ON OBLIGATIONS, CONSIDERED IN A MORAL
AND LEGAL VIEW 114-15 (Francois-Xavier Martin trans., 1802) ('The Roman jurists called
natural obligation that which was destitute of action; that is to say, which did not give the
person to whom it was contracted, the right of requiring, in law, the payment of it"-yet, which
"had all the other effects which a civil obligation could have." Thus, a "payment of what was due
by a mere natural obligation [was] valid and not liable to be recalled."). The notion of natural
obligation travelled into the English common law via Lord Mansfield's decision in Moses v.
Macferlan [1760] 97 Eng. Rep. 676 (K.B.); 2 Burr 1005. See Peter Birks, English and Roman
Learning in Moses v. Macferlan, 37 CURRENT LEGAL PROBLEMS 1, 17 (1984) (U.K.); see also
Duncan Sheehan, Natural Obligations in English Law, LLOYD'S MAR. AND COM. L. Q. 172, 178
(2004) (U.K.).
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breach of trust or otherwise. ' 21 Note that while in defamation cases
before the 2013 Act an injunction against the intermediary was part of
the dynamics of defamation law, this was only the case when-and
because-the intermediary was itself liable for a wrong under the law.
That is no longer the case, as the Defamation Act 2013 exempts the
intermediary from liability.
Now it is true that, outside of the general principle noted by
Markesinis and Deakin, such sorts of injunction have been granted in
a reduced set of famous cases in the realm of privacy law-most
notably in those that became known as cases of 'super' or 'contramundum' injunctions. However, there had been no more than four
cases 216 by the time a committee chaired by Lord Neuberger MR
issued its Report of the Committee on Superinjunctions in 2011.217 In
addition, the Report made very strict recommendations for the further
granting of such injunctions. Recognizing in them a derogation from
the principle of open justice, 218 the Report recommended they be
issued only when strictly necessary, kept to the absolute minimum and
subjected to intense scrutiny21 9-- and, critically, noted that a superinjunction "ceases to have any effect" after a "final determination of
the parties' substantive rights."220 These recommendations are the
absolute opposite of what happens with the injunction rule currently
in force in the law of defamation, which seeks to emulate a relation of
correlativity where correlativity there is none.
IV. RESPONSIBLE COMMUNICATION: EFFORT AND THE BURDENS OF
REASON

A. Normative Negligence
In Bolton v. Stone, Lord Reid famously said: "If cricket cannot
be played on a ground without creating a substantial risk, then it

215.

SIMON

DEAKIN, ANGUS JOHNSTON,

AND BASI

MARKESINIS,

MARKESINIS

AND

DEAKIN'S TORT LAW 874 (7th ed. 2013) ("An injunction may be issued to restrain a threatened act
that, unless restrained, is likely to be repeated, with the result that the claimant will then have
an action based on a civil law wrong.") (emphasis added).
216.
Id. at 879.
217.
Lord Neuberger of Abbotsbury, Report of the Committee on Super-Injunctions:
Super-Injunctions, Anonymised Injunctions and Open Justice (May 20, 2011) [hereinafter Report
of the Committee on Super-Injunctions].
218.
Those, to be fair, are injunctions that restrain the possibility that third parties
publish the names of parties in a legal dispute before the courts. There is no reason, however,
why the precautions prompted by the principle of open justice should not equally be prompted by
the right to freedom of expression.
219.
Report of the Committee on Super-Injunctions, supra note 217, at 12.
220.
Id. at 18.
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should not be played there at all. ' 221 This assertion denotes a
recognition that the difficulty of remedial measures should not
normally be taken into account in negligence liability. However
expensive such measures may be, either they are in place to avoid the
risk-regardless of the subjective possibilities of the agent-or the
activity cannot rightly be undertaken without them at all.
When one thinks of Internet intermediaries, a certain
discomfort may be felt regarding this assertion. After all, it ignores
both the often-profound, normative uncertainties with which
intermediaries are confronted on a daily basis and the burdens
intermediaries face to respond to these.
If risks flow from
intermediaries' activities, as they (at times monumentally) do, should
intermediaries be expected just to move their proverbial "cricket
grounds" off the Internet?
It is tempting to sketch an answer to this question concerning
the burdens of care in either of two ways. First, one can say that the
costs of merely taking content down are not bound to be that
substantial; it would not be a problem that intermediaries, once
notified they host illegal content, would be expected to proceed
expeditiously to purge the content. Intermediaries would thus be
judged simply on whether or not they apply reasonable measures of
care to take content down-on whether they unreasonably delay such
measures or generally just act carelessly in the identification and
purging of the complained materials. Let us call this the "takedownnegligence approach" for it associates negligence to the act of taking
content down.
A second answer holds that the burdens of intermediaries
should not be assessed merely with regard to the taking down of
content, but also with regard to the normative uncertainties to which
an intermediary is exposed in reflecting upon the content, rather than
just simply taking it down. One should, in this sense, recognize that it
is indeed tremendously difficult for intermediaries to reach the right
interpretation of legal norms and, thus, succeed in the evaluation of
content they host. Yet, perhaps the law, instead of deviating from
Bolton by taking into account the burdens of precautions, should just
exempt intermediaries from the obligation of evaluating content
altogether. The concern here, note, is not with the practicality of
taking content down but with the fairness of requiring intermediaries
to evaluate content according to underdeterminate normative
standards. This author calls this response to such a concern the "no
221.
Bolton v. Stone [19511 UKHL 2, [1951] 850 AC (HL) 867 (appeal taken from Eng.).
The situation is different in the United States, where the Learned Hand formula is applied. See
supra note 214 and accompanying text.
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normative-negligence approach." Specifically, this is an approach that
does away with a requirement of reasonable care regarding the
normative standards that make the content legal or illegal.
These two tentative answers do not engage with each other.
They approach the problem of liability from entirely disconnected
dimensions. And they reflect, as might be suspected, the two extremes
discussed in Part II-that is, the extreme of strict liability and the
extreme of exemption of liability. The former discourages reflection by
rendering the intermediary liable for whatever normative outcome
accrues if the intermediary does not assume the responsibility of
taking the content down. The burdens the system articulates, and
thus the negligence in attending to them, concern the taking down of
content. The exemption of liability system, in turn, attends to the
normative dimension of things but only to exonerate the intermediary
from the normative burden of addressing them-it exonerates
intermediaries, that is, from negligence concerning their normative
responsibility towards the relations in which they are embedded and,
ultimately, the system of private law as a whole.
Yet, there is an alternative approach worth considering
regarding the burdens of reasonable
care, besides
the
takedown-negligence and the no normative-negligence approaches.
This author calls this the "normative negligence" approach. As
Weinrib explains, the real concern corrective justice expresses is not
with "factual but normative loss consisting in wrongful infringement
of the plaintiffs rights." 222 The function of the very concept of duty of
care is to "span the normative space between the parties by treating
the injury that occurred in terms of the wrongful risk out of which it
materialized. ' 223 What this author would suggest is an approach that,
differently from both approaches above, transcends the factual
dimension of content takedown to focus on the matter of how an
Internet intermediary lives up to its normative commitments: how
rightly or wrongly it traverses the normative space of his duty of care.
The normative negligence approach recognizes the difficulties in
interpreting the facts (the nature of content) in light of the normative
order (its illegality or illegality). Yet, while paying heed to this
difficulty, this approach does not refrain from requiring a commitment
of normative integrity. In the case of intermediaries, this commitment
requires a pursuit of coherence between the intentional dimension of
the artifacts intermediaries design and the broader set of reasons that
compose the normative order.

222.

WEINRIB, supra note 1, at 157,

223.

Id. at 164.
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The normative negligence approach could be accommodated
without major difficulty by negligence law in both the English common
law approach and in the United States. On one hand, the normative
negligence approach runs afoul of the specific discipline of
intermediary liability in both jurisdictions, which reflects the
problems discussed throughout this Article. On the other hand, the
approach proposed should be taken up precisely as an antidote to that
discipline-recasting intermediary liability in coherence with the
private law system as a whole and the ideas of correlativity we find
within it.
At first sight, that might not seem to be the case, particularly
in reference to Lord Reid's ideas. Recall that Reid asserted that, in
general, the burdens of precaution ought not to be considered in
negligence law. Yet, this Article suggests that the normative burdens
of Internet intermediaries should be taken into account.
It is important, however, to pursue the point further in light of
the contrast Weinrib makes between the English and the US
approaches. In contrast to the Bolton v. Stone approach, 224 the United
States uses the famous Learned Hand formula that holds that risk
creation is only tortious when the probabilities of an accident
occurring, together with the gravity of the loss arising from it, exceed
the burden of adequate precautions for avoiding the accident. 2 5
Weinrib's understanding is that the US approach violates the idea of
correlativity in private law, for what is important for this idea is the
existence of a risk relationship between the parties, not the costs of
eliminating the risk. 226 Weinrib departs from the "standpoint of
Kantian right" to note that corrective justice conceives of "doing and
suffering as a relationship of free will" in which "doer and sufferer
rank equally as self-determining agents in judgments about the level
of permissible risk creation. ' 227 Introducing material calculations
about the economic costs of precaution would violate this normative
equality between the parties and thus the idea of correlativity in
private law. Yet, the point of this Part is that the burdens to be

224.
See supra note 210 and accompanying text.
225.
See WEINRIB, supra note 1, at 148 (discussing United States v. Carroll Towing Co.,
159 F.2d 169, 173 (2d Cir. 1947)).
226.
Id.
227.
Id. at 152. It is for viewing people as equally morally autonomous that, in
determining the standards of reasonable care, tort law abstracts "from such particulars as social
status and moral character" of the parties. Id. at 81. Weinrib's ideas of correlativity see people
normatively connected merely as abstract doers and sufferers, via formal and universal laws of
reasons that "express the dignity of self-determining agency in a coherent tort law." Id. at 203.
And, in all fairness, there indeed has been a longstanding jurisprudential trend along these
lines, extending from cases like Vaughan v. Menlove, (1837) 132 ER 490 to date.
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attenuated are not economic burdens of precaution only but also
normative burdens to reason itself.
Sure, accounting for burdens arising from technology can be
done as part of a material, cost-related analysis and thus be
accommodated within the Learned Hand formula. Yet, this is not the
only way these burdens can be accounted for. Technologies, while
empowering people to the extent people can master them, 228 can also
operate as constraints when people do not. 229 Even designers are only
designers to a certain extent. The normativity reflected in use plans
occurs in an interplay between reasons which designers can fully
master and control and reasons that may at times lie completely
outside designers' possibilities of mastery. These reasons may spring
inscrutably from within a use plan itself-or they may spring from
other use plans, from an ever proliferating universe of reasons that go
beyond the complexity of even the most sophisticated legal system,
and whose constraints, we have seen in Section III.A, often operate in
a tacit way.
Understanding the complexity of the interplay above does not
need to commit us to inquiring into variable psychical circumstances
in determining the normative boundaries of intermediary
liability-though it is fair to acknowledge the existence of a difficulty
here. Taking into account both the different possibilities of mastery of
technological reasons and the constraints these possibilities impose
may seem to open Pandora's box. It may seem so because the same
points this Article makes about technological reasons may also
reasonably be made with regard to legal and cultural reasons more
broadly. These are reasons that the idea of correlativity in private law
generally tends to put aside, as expressive of subjective criteria whose
examination violates the formal equality between parties. Attending
to the use plans of technological artifacts might thus just reveal a
problem that, throughout its history, negligence law has had
difficulties in providing an answer to-namely, the problem of
determining where exactly reasons lie, when one considers their
228.
See generally MARSHALL McLUAN, UNDERSTANDING MEDIA: THE EXTENSIONS OF
MAN (1964); see also THE NETWORK SOCIETY: A CROSS-CULTURAL PERSPECTIVE 11 (Manuel

Castells, ed., 2004) (noting the very idea of an information age, to be characterized by the
"augmentation of the human capacity of information processing and communication" enabled by
new technologies).
229.
Heidegger thought, more fundamentally, that the essence of technology is
enframing, a "destining of revealing," of "bringing-forth" (poi sis) the truth. From what follows
that our very perception of being is destined by the essence of technology. See Heidegger, supra
note 132, at 24-25; see also MAX WEBER, THE PROTESTANT ETHIC AND THE SPIRIT OF CAPITALISM

123 (Talcott Parsons trans., 1992) (speaking of the technical condition as an iron cage for all who
are born into it).
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existence between moral autonomy and socially determined forms.
Tort law's focus on moral autonomy may, in the end, have happened
at the expense of the much more granular value of personal autonomy.
But this problem is too large to examine here, and one may still
be able to address the central question of this Article even if she does
not agree on the points above. The visualization of the problem,
however, enables us to see what may be the particular difficulty facing
the normative responsibility of intermediaries and the type of
negligence that should attach to its violation. This difficulty, which is
fundamental to understand as we resolve the inquiry in this Article, is
the following: whenever intermediaries settle disputes, the variable
universe discussed in the preceding paragraphs materializes within
these disputes-it materializes in the circumstances of the parties and
in the complexities of the relationships between these. When Google
settles the hundreds of thousands of data privacy disputes, the
reasons within each of these disputes will vary in ways that may be
more or less-some completely-detached from Google's own
evaluative powers and capabilities. There is no predictability as to
what sorts of disputes will arise concerning actors and technological,
legal and overall cultural matters.
It may very well be that, in relation to our discussions in the
preceding paragraphs, one thinks we should not attend to the burdens
of precaution in proportion to the normative complexity of
intermediaries' self-regarding activities. Be that as it may, it is the
normative complexity of the other-regardinguniverse that, after all, is
of the very nature of what being an intermediary is, which is of
particular concern in this Article. In this respect, intermediaries may
differ from other technological actors who play a more self-sufficient
role in the development of their artifacts. The difference may well be
one of import.
All normativity-and indeed, the responsibility
towards it-is conversational. 23 0 But, in each settlement of normative
questions and in embedding these settlements in the use plans of the
artifacts they design, intermediaries carry on a normative dialogue
with other actors whose center of gravity concerns much more reasons

230.

See MICHAEL MCKENNA, CONVERSATION AND RESPONSIBILITY 2-3 (2012) (noting,

based on Strawson, that "moral responsibility is essentially interpersonal," in that "facts about
an agent's being morally responsible depend upon considerations about the nature of holding
responsible, where holding responsible is understood as a practical affair, and not just a matter
of judging some propositions about an agent to be true or false." "Holding morally responsible," in
McKenna's view, ought to be "understood as a stage in something analogous to an unfolding
conversation of the sort occurring between competent speakers of a language, a dialogue between
the morally responsible agent who is responsible, and those in the moral community holding her
responsible").
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regarding these other actors and their circumstances than reasons
regarding intermediaries themselves.
Yet, because intermediaries' settlements regarding these
reasons matter-for the values they entail, for their connection to the
broader system of reasons that compose private law-intermediaries
ought to be held responsible for a pursuit of integrity between them
and the larger set of reasons that compose our normative order. It is
to this pursuit that the idea of normative negligence attaches.
But just how should this pursuit of normative integrity by
Internet intermediaries be carried out-or, in other words, how should
one conceive of the normative negligence approach regarding Internet
intermediaries?
B. Responsible Communication
A preliminary answer has already been sketched in the
preceding Section-namely, that our approach to intermediary
liability should build upon the idea of responsible communication on
matters in the public interest. Normative negligence here would
simply mean the placing of a conceptual emphasis in the normative
dimension of negligence liability-and an indication that current
approaches fail to pay heed to this dimension. The placing of an
emphasis in this normative dimension entails a duty of reasonable
care towards normativity itself and in turn that a certain threshold
must exist to accommodate the existence of honest mistakes. Like
those who publish news articles and are allowed to escape when they
fail to get the facts straight-insofar as they reasonably, or
responsibly, believe that the publication furthers the public
interest-so should Internet intermediaries be given a margin of
appreciation within which they can responsibly conduct their
activities, without an expectation of normative certainty concerning
the disputes they settle. As Chief Justice McLachlin noted for the
court in Grant v. Torstar Corp.:
[A] degree of deference should be shown to the editorial judgment of the players,
particularly professional editors and journalists. For instance, a court should be slow to
conclude that the inclusion of a particular defamatory statement was "unnecessary" and
therefore outside the scope of the defence. As Lord Hoffmann put it: The fact that the
judge, with the advantage of leisure and hindsight, might have made a different
editorial decision should not destroy the defence. That would make the publication of
in the public interest, too risky and would discourage
articles which are, ex hypothesi,
231
investigative reporting.

231.

Grant v. Torstar Corp., 3 S.C.R. at 675.
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There is no reason why the same margin of appreciation could not be
conferred to intermediaries, whose challenges are even steeper, on the
condition that they act responsibly.
Of course, the expected objection to this approach could be, as
in the general case of the responsible communication defense, that the
criteria for evaluating the reasonableness or responsibility of the
intermediary are somewhat underdeterminate-an issue aggravated
by the Defamation Act 2013, which sought to lend more flexibility to
the criteria until then comprised by the Reynolds defense. Yet, as
explained by Lord Justice Nicholls in Reynolds, one must not
exaggerate the extent of the uncertainty of the responsible
communication test. 232 First, courts can issue guidelines-in our case
strengthened by an emerging case law practiced by intermediaries
themselves. Second, in Nicholls L.J.'s words, "The common law does
not seek to set a higher standard than that of responsible journalism,
a standard the media themselves espouse,"233 and which in our case
should surely be within the purview of intermediaries as well due to
the inevitability of their making decisions in one direction or another.
The converse conclusion, as examined above, would entail an
exoneration of responsibility that not only is incompatible with the
idea of correlativity but ultimately reflects a privilege not extended to
other sectors of society. Tipping J.'s eloquent observations in this
regard deserve particular reverence:
It could be seen as rather ironic that whereas almost all sectors of society, and all other
occupations and professions have duties to take reasonable care, and are accountable in
one form or another if they are careless, the news media whose power and capacity to
cause harm and distress are considerable if that power is not responsibly used, are not
liable in negligence, and what is more, can claim qualified privilege even if they are
negligent. It may be asked whether the public interest in freedom of expression is so
great that the accountability which society requires of others, should not also to this
2 34
extent be required of the news media.'

Note, also, that media ought to be interpreted expansively in the case
of the responsible communication defense. As Lord Hoffman made
clear per the House of Lords in Jameel, "the [responsible
communication] defense is of course available to anyone who publishes
material of public interest in any medium. The question in each case
is whether the defendant behaved fairly and responsibly in gathering
and publishing the information." In Grant v. Torstar Corp., the
Supreme Court of Canada noted as the very reason for our speaking of

232.
Reynolds v. Times, [1999] UKHL 45 at [202].
233.
Id.
234.
Lange v. Atkinson [1998] 3 NZLR 424 at 477 (NZ). (cited with approval by Nicholls
L.J. in Reynolds).
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a responsible communication on matters of public interest, the
following
[T]he traditional media are rapidly being complemented by new ways of communicating
on matters of public interest, many of them online, which do not involve journalists.
These new disseminators of news and information should, absent good reasons for
exclusion, be subject to the same laws as established media outlets. 2 3 5 ...
The press and others engaged in public communication on matters of public interest,
like bloggers, must act carefully, having regard to the injury to reputation that a false
statement can cause. A defense based on responsible conduct reflects the social concern
that the media should be held accountable through the law of defamation. As Kirby P.
stated in Ballina Shire Council v. Ringland (1994), 33 N.S.W.L.R. 680 (C.A.), at p. 700:
"The law of defamation is one of the comparatively few checks upon [the media's] great
23 6
power."

It is clear from the excerpt above that the court in Grant considered it
appropriate to extend the responsible communication defense to
bloggers and other news disseminators of the present. There is no
reason why the same conclusions above should not apply to Internet
intermediaries-that is, like all other occupations, theirs assigns them
duties to take reasonable care and use responsibly their powers and
capacities, on pain of being held in negligence otherwise. Such duties
are particularly accentuated when actors have the capacity to cause
considerable harm and distress if their powers are not responsibly
237
used, a capacity which intermediaries doubtlessly have.

But beyond the boundaries of each incident, the lack of
expectations that Internet intermediaries behave responsibly provokes
perturbations of a more broadly normative nature. The negligence of
intermediaries matters for the intelligibility and coherence of private
law itself; their responsibility ought to be recognized as a normative
one within this largest context as well.
Intermediaries, must
accordingly be called on to "take the task of legal thinking upon
themselves," for their decisions become a fundamental component of
the "justificatory enterprise" that private law consists of-a collective
wisdom "fined and refined by an infinite number of Grave and
Learned Men," through which "normative connections" get articulated
"between controversies and their resolutions. ' 238
Intermediaries,
indeed, ought to adopt a posture of gravity and coherence regarding
this collective wisdom, and the law must recognize their responsibility
in doing so.

235.
Grant v. Torstar Corp., 3 S.C.R. at 685.
236.
Id. at 669-79.
237.
The very intelligibility of risk cannot take place "in abstraction from a set of perils
and a set of persons imperiled." WEINRIB, supra, note 1, at 160.
238.
Id. at 12.
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C. Effort and Normative Responsibility
As in the responsible communication defense-indeed, as in the
law of negligence more broadly-this obligation by intermediaries is
an obligation to try. As John Gardner explains: "Negligence in law is
a failure to try assiduously enough to avert (limit, reduce, control) the
unwelcome side-effects of one's (otherwise valuable) endeavours. It
follows that the obligation that one fails to perform when one acts
negligently is indeed an obligation to try. The nonperformance of an
obligation to try is what gives rise to fault. ' 23 9 In the responsible
communication defense, likewise, the obligation expected is one of
assiduity, rather than one of perfection. As stated by the Supreme
Court of Canada in Grant, "People in public life are entitled to expect
that the media and other reporters will act responsibly in protecting
them from false accusations and innuendo. They are not, however,
entitled to demand perfection and the inevitable silencing of critical
comment that a standard of perfection would impose. '240 But they
must be entitled at least to the commitment that others will try
responsibly to reflect the truth and serve the public interest when
publishing or knowingly disseminating information about them.
Critically, as in the responsible communication defense, the
normative negligence approach to intermediary liability does not take
trying to entail a purely factual commitment.
Rather, such a
commitment means that intermediaries ought to reach the best
normative interpretation possible regarding the disputes they settle.
It does not purely mean trying to take content down (though it may
also include that as a result), neither does it mean being exempted
from trying. The seriousness of the allegation, the urgency and public
importance of the matter, the status and reliability of the source, the
pursuit and accurate report of the plaintiffs view, the necessity and
proportionality of the publication, the public interest in the making of
the statement (rather than in its truth)241-these are all factors of
strongly normative nature, more so as they become part of a coherent
whole of past decisions, which intermediaries ought to take into
account.
At the same time, however, such factors are all procedural
ones, which do not determine a fixed substance for the duty of care of
intermediaries. Such a substance will vary in accordance with the
circumstances of the cases intermediaries settle. This variance
reveals a very interesting feature of this form of liability-not unlike
239.
240.
241.

Gardner, supra note 195, at 13.
Grant v. Torstar Corp., 3 S.C.R. at 685.
Id. at 694.
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the case with the responsible communication defense in general. Such
a feature is that, unlike the general case in tort law, where the
standard of care is of an objective nature, the standard of care for the
liability of intermediaries may, ultimately, be a variable one-at least
regarding its substance. While for the media in general editorial
choice "may involve a variety of considerations and ... should be
granted generous scope," 242 decisions in cases settled by
intermediaries will rest on interpretations to whose undertaking
courts should give a wide margin of appreciation. These decisions will
involve a complex range of factors of technological, legal, and, in all
this, cultural dimensions. The one responsibility the public should
require from intermediaries is one of normative integrity-a
commitment of trying assiduously enough to succeed in understanding
and evaluating the facts brought before them, in coherence with the
central normative commitments of the communities they inhabit.
V. CONCLUSION

Just how hard should an intermediary try? Is the level of
commitment expected from an organization like Google the same that
should be expected from a startup company? We saw that, in Google
Spain, the Court of Justice of the European Union alluded to taking
the powers and capabilities of the intermediary into account. 243 Does
this consideration mean that responsibility should vary according to
the technological and cultural possibilities of the agent? This Article
has only been able to hint at answers to these questions. Answering
them is necessary to provide a more fully systematized approach to
intermediary liability in light of tort law. This is particularly because
some of these answers might seem to place intermediary liability in
dissonance with the general approach of negligence law.
The factors highlighted towards the end of the preceding
Section 244 offer a template that can be applied not only to defamation
but to some extent to privacy as well. Their assessment depends on a
capacity for inquiry that seems unfair to demand different
intermediaries to reflect on an objectively uniform basis, "regardless of
[their] individual abilities or disabilities" 245-though this is the path
traditionally taken in the common law of negligence. This author
believes this contradiction is only apparent. Further scholarship will
show that variation according to the technological possibilities of the

242.
243.
244.
245.

Id. at 118.
See supra note 120 and accompanying text.
See supra Section IV.C.
DEAKIN ET AL., supra note 215, at 203.
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actor, for instance, for it transcends the actor's own individual
circumstances, can be reconciled with the general idea of correlativity
we have discussed in this work. Taking this into account does not
violate notions of formal equality, insofar as we understand and
accommodate within tort law theory the burdens that contemporary
technological development places on both practical reason and the
very possibilities of different actors choosing their reasons for
action-and, ultimately, on the responsibilities we can expect from
them.
What we sought to accomplish in this Article was to highlight
the normative dimension of intermediary responsibility.
What
matters, in this sense, is not purely whether content is taken down or
not, which is something not more significantly challenging to
accomplish on a wider scale. What matters is the normative assiduity
of intermediaries: the reasonable care devoted to the very thought
processes by which intermediaries choose their reasons for action.
This is not a utilitarian enterprise, nor it is one towards which
intermediaries should or can be neutral. As in Ernest Weinrib's
statement presented at the beginning of this Article, 46 intermediaries
change our world through action. Their actions come via the design of
use plans of technological artifacts, which have great consequence on
how other actors author their lives. Such consequences both extend
and ought to extend beyond the creation of an ever-unfolding highway
for expression and technological development. The propriety of use
plans needs to be judged beyond their utility. Specifically, it should be
judged from a deontological and normative perspective as well.
Through each single decision on the nature of content,
intermediaries decide on the normative configurations of the
information environment itself; they exercise their authority as
designers and thus communicate what, in their tremendously
significant views, is proper or improper within the use plans they
enact. There is great responsibility in reaching such decisions.
Beyond the miniscule fraction of cases that will be settled by courts, it
is the integrity of intermediaries' decisions that will, for the most part,
enable the Internet to affirm or undermine the public good of
assurance-the assurance that each of us will have a place to stand
and view the world from the height of who we are. Membership in our
political community requires responsibility towards this public good.
It is a matter of justice, beyond mere allocative correction, that the
normative avenues for the recognition of personhood are properly and
institutionally designed. This is a project to which we all must be
personally committed.
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See WEINRIB, supra note 1 and accompanying text.

